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GB/T 34136-2017: Electrical safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery
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Electrical safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery
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Basic data | Standard ID | GB/T 34136-2017 (GB/T34136-2017) | | Description (Translated English) | Electrical safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery | | Sector / Industry | National Standard (Recommended) | | Classification of Chinese Standard | J07 | | Classification of International Standard | 29.020 | | Word Count Estimation | 14,162 | | Date of Issue | 2017-07-31 | | Date of Implementation | 2018-02-01 | | Issuing agency(ies) | General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China, Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China | GB/T 34136-2017: Electrical safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery
---This is a DRAFT version for illustration, not a final translation. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.) will be manually/carefully translated upon your order.
Electrical safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery
ICS 29.020
J07
National Standards of People's Republic of China
Mechanical and electrical safety GB 28526 and
GB/T 16855.1 for machinery safety
Application Guidelines for Design of Related Control Systems
Electricalsafetyofmachinery-GuidanceontheapplicationofGB 28526and
GB/T 16855.1inthedesignofsafety-relatedcontrolsystemsformachinery
(IEC /T R62061-1.2010, Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and
IEC 62061inthedesignofsafety-relatedcontrolsystemsformachinery, IDT)
Published on.2017-07-31
2018-02-01 Implementation
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China
Released by the Standardization Administration of China
Mechanical and electrical safety GB 28526 and
GB/T 16855.1 for machinery safety
Application Guidelines for Design of Related Control Systems
1 Scope
This standard specifies the application guidelines of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 for the design of mechanical safety-related control systems.
2 Overview
2.1 GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 both stipulate the relevant requirements for the design and implementation of machinery safety-related control systems. These two standards
Although the methods specified in the standard are different, when used correctly, the risk can be reduced to the corresponding level.
2.2 These two standards classify safety-related control systems that perform safety functions according to the probability of dangerous failure per hour.
GB/T 16855.1 is divided into 5 performance levels (PL). a, b, c, d and e; while GB 28526 is divided into 3 safety integrity levels (SIL).
1, 2 and 3.
2.3 Safety requirements for safety-related control systems specified by technical committees of product standards (Category C), it is recommended that these technical committees comply with PL
Classify with the confidence level required by SIL.
2.4 Mechanical designers can choose GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 standard according to specific application characteristics.
2.5 Which standard to choose and use needs to be determined by considering the following factors, such as.
---In the design of mechanical safety-related control systems, previous knowledge and experience are based on the classes described in GB/T 16855.1-2008.
different concepts, it may mean that GB/T 16855.1-2008 is more appropriate;
--- For safety-related control systems based on media other than electrical technology, GB/T 16855.1 is more appropriate;
--- When the user requires the term SIL to prove the safety integrity level of the mechanical safety-related control system, the GB 28526 update is used.
Suitable;
--- When mechanical safety-related control systems are used, for example, in the process industry, when other safety-related systems (such as complying with GB/T 21109
The safety instrumented system) is characterized by SIL, then GB 28526 is more appropriate.
3 Standard comparison
3.1 The technical requirements of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 are compared as follows.
---the term;
--- risk assessment and performance allocation;
--- Specification of safety requirements;
--- system integrity requirements;
---Diagnostic function;
--- Software security requirements.
3.2 In addition, both standards give the probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFHD) and the mean time between failures for evaluation.
Simplified mathematical formula for (MTTFd).
3.3 The standard comparison conclusions are as follows.
---By integrating non-complex safety-related electrical control systems designed in accordance with GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 standards
(SRECS) subsystems or control system safety-related parts (SRP/CS), designed using either of these two standards
All safety-related control systems can achieve an acceptable level of functional safety;
--- By integrating subsystems of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic equipment designed in accordance with GB/T 20438, these two standards are also available
To provide design solutions for complex SRECS and SRP/CS;
---Currently, it is meaningful for the machinery industry to use these two standards, and experience shows that users will benefit. Actual application for a reasonable period of time
With feedback, it is necessary to promote the merger of the two standards of GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1;
---Due to differences in details, and some concepts (e.g. functional safety management) further work is required to establish the respective design methods
Correspondence between laws and some technical requirements.
4 Risk assessment and required performance allocation
4.1 Compare methods of assigning SIL and/or PLr to specific safety functions. One of the respective methods provided in Appendix A of each standard
There is a good level of correspondence.
4.2 Regardless of the method used, care should be taken to ensure that appropriate judgments are made on the risk parameters to determine what is applicable to the specific safety function.
SIL and/or PLr. This judgment is best done with the participation of relevant personnel (such as design, maintenance and operators) to ensure a correct understanding of the machinery
possible danger.
4.3 See GB/T 15706 and GB/T 20438.5 for more information on the risk assessment process and allocation of performance objectives.
5 Specification of safety requirements
5.1 The respective methods of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 require that the safety function be implemented by the safety-related control system in the first stage.
5.2 Each safety function performed by the control circuit should be evaluated, for example, using Appendix A of GB/T 16855.1 or GB 28526.
Appendix A. It should be determined what level of risk reduction the specific safety function of each machine provides, and in turn the controls that perform that safety function.
The confidence level required by the circuit.
5.3 The given confidence level of PL and/or SIL is related to the specific safety function.
5.4 The information related to the safety function shown below should be provided by the product standard (Category C).
Safety functions to be performed by the control circuit.
--- the name of the safety function;
--- a description of the function;
---Performance level required by GB/T 16855.1.PLra~e; or/and
--- According to the safety integrity level required by GB 28526.SIL1~3.
6 Performance Target Assignment. PL vs. SIL
Table 1 presents the relationship between PL and SIL based on the average probability of dangerous failure per hour. However, for these probabilistic objectives, two
This standard also specifies other requirements (such as system safety integrity, etc.), which also apply to safety-related control systems. The harshness of these requirements
The grades are related to the respective PL and SIL.
7 System Design
7.1 General requirements for system design using GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1
When designing a SRECS/SRP/CS, the following aspects should be considered.
--- When used within their respective limits, either of the two standards can be used to design safety-related controls with appropriate functional safety.
control system, expressed as SIL or PL.
--- Non-complex safety-related components designed in accordance with GB/T 16855.1 with relevant PL can be integrated as subsystems in accordance with
In the safety-related electrical control system designed in GB 28526.Any complex security design related to PL according to GB/T 16855.1
All relevant components can be integrated into the safety-related components of the control system designed in accordance with GB/T 16855.1.
---Any non-complex subsystem designed and implemented in accordance with GB 28526 with the relevant SIL can be integrated as a safety-related component into
In the SRP/CS combination designed according to GB/T 16855.1.
---Any complex subsystem designed in accordance with GB/T 20438 with the relevant SIL can be integrated as a safety-related component in accordance with
In the SRP/CS combination designed in GB/T 16855.1, or as a subsystem integrated into the SRP/CS designed in accordance with GB 28526
in SRECS.
7.2 Estimation of PFHD and MTTFd and Use of Troubleshooting
7.2.1 PFHD and MTTFd
7.2.1.1 When the MTTFd value in GB/T 16855.1 is related to a single-channel SRP/CS without diagnostics, it is only in this case
Reciprocal of PFHD in GB 28526.
7.2.1.2 MTTFd is a parameter that does not take into account any given factor (such as diagnostics or architecture) and/or a single channel, while PFHD is a
The parameters of the subsystem for diagnostic and architectural factors determined by the design structure.
7.2.1.3 Annex K of GB/T 16855.1 gives the MTTFd and
relationship to PFHD.
7.2.1.4 According to GB/T 16855.1, the PFHD of SRP/CS combined in series can be estimated by using the neutron subsystem in GB 28526.
A similar method, calculated by accumulating the PFHD value of each SRP/CS (eg from Appendix K of GB/T 16855.1).
7.2.2 Use of Troubleshooting
7.2.2.1 Both standards allow the use of troubleshooting, see 6.7.7 of GB 28526 and 7.3 of GB/T 16855.1.GB 28526
SRECS is not allowed to use faults without hardware fault tolerance (requires SIL3 without hardware fault tolerance)
exclude.
7.2.2.2 Using Troubleshooting, it is important that they are properly judged and the SRP/CS or SRECS expected life cycle is valid.
7.2.2.3 In general, where the safety function achieved by SRP/CS or SRECS is PLe or SIL3, it should not rely solely on
Troubleshooting to get this level of performance. It depends on the technology employed and the environment in which it is expected to operate. Therefore, designers use troubleshooting
To increase PL or SIL, extra care is required.
7.2.2.4 To achieve PLe or SIL3 in SRP/CS or SRECS design, troubleshooting does not apply to electromechanical position switches and manual operation
The mechanical part of a switch (eg, an emergency stop device). These troubleshooting can be applied to specific mechanical failure conditions (eg. wear/corrosion,
fracture) has been described in GB/T 16855.2-2007.
7.2.2.5 For example, door interlocking systems that are subject to PLe or SIL3 are generally not judged by troubleshooting (eg stop switch actuators),
To achieve this level of performance, a minimum fault tolerance of 1 (eg two conventional mechanical position switches) will need to be incorporated. However, row
Failures other than short circuits in wiring circuits in control panels designed to relevant standards are acceptable.
7.2.2.6 See GB/T 16855.2 for more information on troubleshooting use.
7.3 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS conforming to GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1
7.3.1 All conditions of the safety-related part of the subsystem or control system designed in accordance with GB/T 16855.1 or GB 28526, if the
All requirements of the relevant system level standard can be claimed to be consistent with the system level standard.
7.3.2 The design of the safety-related parts of the subsystem or control system shall meet the corresponding requirements of GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1.
Compliance with more than one requirement that fully meets these standards is permitted.
7.3.3 When designing subsystems or safety-related parts of the control system, it is not allowed to mix the requirements of the standards.
7.4 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS already designed by other standards
7.4.1 In the system design, you can choose sub-systems that comply with relevant product standards and GB/T 20438, GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1
systems (for example, electro-sensitive protective equipment). Suppliers of various types of subsystems should provide information in accordance with GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 for
Necessary information for the integration of subsystems into safety-related control systems.
7.4.2 Subsystems (such as speed-regulating electrical drive systems) designed using product standards (such as GB/T 12668.502-2013) are implemented
GB/T 20438 requirements, can be used in accordance with GB 28526 (see GB 28526 in 6.7.3) and GB/T 16855.1 designed safety phase
in the control system.
7.4.3 According to the requirements in GB 28526, subsystems designed using other standards shall comply with the provisions in 6.7.3 of GB 28526.
8 Examples
8.1 Overview
The following examples assume that all requirements of both standards have been met. This example is only intended to demonstrate certain aspects of the standard application.
8.2 Simplified example of design and validation of safety-related control systems performing specified safety-related control functions
8.2.1 This simplified example is intended to demonstrate that a subsystem or SRP/CS conforming to GB 28526 and/or GB/T 16855.1 is in
Use in SRECS/SRP/CS. This example is based on the realization of a safety function, which is linked to the position monitoring of active guards
safety-related stop function, and a Safety Integrity Level SIL3 or required Performance Level PLre is specified, as shown in Figure 1.
8.2.2 The following information is relevant to the specification of the safety requirements for this example.
security function
---Safety-related stop function, triggered by a protective device. the opening of the movable protective device triggers the safety function STO (safe torque off
remove).
Function description
--- Protected by movable guards (guards). The opening of the interlocking guard is detected by two position switches B1/B2, using
The opening contact/making contact combination is evaluated by the central safety module K1.K1 activates the two contactors Q1 and Q2
action, exit to interrupt or prevent a dangerous movement or state;
---The position switch is monitored for the rationality of K1 fault detection. Faults in Q1 and Q2 are detected by the K1 start-up test.
The start command can only be executed when Q1 and Q2 have exited. No start-up required by opening and closing interlocked guards
dynamic test;
--- In case of failure of components, the safety function should remain intact. Interlocking guards that can cause Q1 and Q2 to exit and fail to operate
Detectable faults during operation or execution (opening and closing);
--- The accumulation of more than two faults between two consecutive executions can lead to the loss of the safety function.
8.2.3 The following characteristic requirements should also be provided.
---Basic and proven safety rules are followed (for example, the load current of contactors Q1 and Q2 is
50%), the requirements of Category B are met. protective circuits are implemented (for example, contact protection);
--- Firm installation of the protection device to ensure the normal operation of the position switch;
--- According to Appendix K of GB 14048.5-2008, switch B1 is a position switch with a direct disconnect function;
--- The power supply wires of position switches B1 and B2 are placed separately or with protection.
8.2.4 The following are valid information for each part within the SRP/CS design from the manufacturer.
--- declared by the manufacturer that the safety module K1 meets the requirements of category 4, PLe and SILCL3;
--- Contactors Q1 and Q2 have mechanically connected contact elements that meet the requirements of Annex L in IEC 60947-5-1.2003.
8.2.5 The design of the SRP/CS and/or SRECS should take into account.
--- Category 4 can only be achieved when several mechanical position switches of different protection devices are not connected in series (ie not cascaded).
Otherwise, the failure of the switch cannot be detected.
8.2.6 Calculation of failure probability according to GB/T 16855.1.
Figure 2 shows the logic subsystem (safety module K1) to which the dual-channel I/O unit is connected. Since the abstraction of the hardware layer has been
Given in the fully correlated block diagram, the subsystem sequences are in principle interchangeable. Therefore, it is recommended to combine subsystems sharing the same structure, such as
shown in Figure 3.The calculation of PL can be simplified by reducing the MTTFd number of channels to 100 during evaluation.
Failure probability of safety module K1, declared by the manufacturer and added to the calculation result [2.31 × 10-9 per hour (value given by the manufacturer), applicable
in PLe]. For the rest of the subsystems, the failure probability is calculated as follows.
---MTTFd. The B10d value of 1000000 cycles (the value given by the manufacturer) is to illustrate the mechanical part of B1.for position switches
The value of B2, B10d is 500000 cycles (the value given by the manufacturer). 365 working days a year, 24 working hours a day, with
and the cycle time of 900s (15min), the annual work of the component calculated by the formulas (C.2) and (C.7) in GB/T 16855.1
The period nop is 35040.
nop=
dop×hop×3600 seconds/hour
t period =
365 days/year x 24 hours/day x 3600 seconds/hour
900 seconds/cycle = 35040
cycle/year
Here given MTTFd, Ch1 value is 190 years, MTTFd, Ch2 value is 114 years. MTTFd of two channels according to GB/T 16855.1
is restricted to 100, in which case the MTTFd of the two channels after the restriction is equal and it is not necessary to perform symmetry.
---DCavg. B1 and B2 take 99% DC based on reasonable monitoring of the break/connect contact combination in K1.contactor Q1 and
The 99% DC of Q2 is derived from periodic monitoring during K1 start-up. The DC value stated for each subsystem is equivalent to
DCavg. The DCavg value can be calculated according to the formula (E.1) in GB/T 16855.1.Since each individual DC is 99%,
So DCavg is also 99%.
--- In subsystems B1/B2 and Q1/Q2 there are sufficient measures against common cause failure (70 points). separation (15), proven components (5),
Protection against overvoltage etc. (15) and ambient conditions (25 10).
--- Mission time. As a simplified method of GB/T 16855.1, it is assumed that the mission time is 20 years.
--- Subsystem B1/B2/Q1/Q2 corresponds to category 4 with high MTTFd (100 years) and high DCavg (99%). This results in every small
The average probability of dangerous failure is 2.47×10-8 (see Table K.1 in GB/T 16855.1). The following additional subsystem K1, dangerous
The average probability of dangerous failure is 2.70×10-8 per hour. This is equivalent to PLe.
8.2.7 Calculate the failure probability according to GB 28526.
8.2.7.1 According to 6.6.2 of GB 28526, the circuit arrangement can be divided into three subsystems. B1/B2, K and Q1/Q2, such as safety related block diagram
shown.
8.2.7.2 The probability of failure for subsystem K is 2.31 x 10-9 per hour and safety integrity level 3 for safety module K1 is manufactured by
given by the business.
8.2.7.3 For other subsystems, the failure probability can be estimated as follows.
--- Subsystem B1/B2.B10d value of 1000000 cycles (the value given by the manufacturer) is specified for the mechanical part of B1.open for location
Off B2, the value of B10d is 500000 cycles (the value given by the manufacturer). 365 working days per year, 24 working hours per day and
15min cycle time, the C value of these parts is 4 cycles per hour. The failure rate is calculated as. 0.1×C/B10d=4×10-7 per
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