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Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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HAD 102/11-2019
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Standard similar to HAD10211-2019 HAD 102/13 HAD 102/10 HAD 102/02 Basic data | Standard ID | HAD 102/11-2019 (HAD102/11-2019) | | Description (Translated English) | (Nuclear Power Plant Fire and Explosion-proof Design) | | Sector / Industry | Chinese Industry Standard | HAD10211-2019: Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design---This is a DRAFT version for illustration, not a final translation. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.) will be manually/carefully translated upon your order.
HA D10211-2019
(Nuclear Power Plant Fire and Explosion-proof Design)
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attachment1
Nuclear Safety Guide HA D 102/11–2019
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
(Approved and released by the National Nuclear Safety Administration on December 31,:2019
National Nuclear Safety Administration
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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1 Introduction
1:1 Purpose
1:1:1 This guideline is a reference to the Safety Regulations for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants (HA F 102, with
hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") in the description and refinement of the relevant provisions, for the nuclear power plant design unit
and license applicants to provide guidance on the internal fire and explosion protection design of nuclear power plants:
1:1:2 The annexes to this guideline are reference documents:
1:2 Scope
1:2:1 These Guidelines are applicable to onshore stationary thermal neutron reactor nuclear power plants: right
For other types of nuclear power plants, the internal fire-proof and explosion-proof design may refer to this guideline:
However, targeted evaluation should be carried out:
1:2:2 This guideline only deals with the protection of items important to safety in nuclear power plants:
Internal fire protection and explosion-proof design measures, excluding fire protection and personnel safety protection in nuclear power plants
General requirements for protection and property protection:
1:2:3 The relevant content of explosion protection in this guideline is the release of radiation to nuclear power plant systems and components:
Protection against explosions caused by flammable liquids and gases, not involving self-explosion of systems and components
explosion protection: Systems and components should address their explosion protection issues by their own design:
2 General
2:1 Overview
2:1:1 The Regulations put forward basic requirements for the fire protection system of nuclear power plants: in the nucleus
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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In the design and arrangement of structures, systems and components important to safety in power plants, the
Reduce the likelihood and consequences of internal fires and explosions caused by internal and external events:
It should be maintained to shut down the reactor, discharge waste heat, contain radioactive material and monitor the state of the nuclear power plant:
ability: should be implemented through the use of multiple components, diverse systems, physical isolation, and fail-safe
The appropriate combination achieves the following goals:
(1) Prevent fire from happening;
(2) Quickly detect and extinguish fires that do occur, thereby limiting fire damage;
(3) Prevent the spread of fires that have not yet been extinguished and make them effective for performing important safety functions:
system impact is minimized:
2:1:2 The fire protection design of nuclear power plants shall meet the following requirements:
(1) Minimize the probability of fire occurrence;
(2) Early detection of fire through a combination of automatic and/or manual fire fighting
and fire fighting;
(3) Prevention of fire spread by fire barriers and physical or spatial isolation:
2:1:3 The explosion-proof design shall be implemented according to the following steps:
(1) Prevent explosions;
(2) If an explosive atmosphere is unavoidable, the risk of explosion should be minimized;
(3) Take design measures to limit the consequences of explosions:
In the case where neither step (1) nor (2) can be achieved, step (3) should be used:
2:1:4 In the design of the nuclear power plant, multiple safety systems should be set up to avoid false
It is assumed that an initiating event (such as a fire or explosion) prevents the safety system from performing its specified safety function:
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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can: When the multiplicity and variety of security systems decreases, each layer of security should be strengthened
Protection of the system from fire and explosion: In terms of fire, generally
Improvements in passive protection, physical isolation, and/or use of more automatic fire alarms
system and fire extinguishing system:
2:1:5 The fire protection design shall be carried out based on the following assumptions:
(1) Fire can occur in any fixed or temporary combustible material;
(2) Only one fire occurs at the same time, and the subsequent fire spread shall be recognized as
to be part of the single event;
(3) Fire can occur in any normal operating state of the nuclear power plant:
In addition, consideration should be given to the risk of fire and other assumed initiating events that may be independent of fire:
combination (see Section 2:5):
2:1:6 A fire hazard analysis shall be carried out to demonstrate that the nuclear power plant design satisfies the
Security objectives described in Section 2:1:1: Section 3:5 gives the scope and scope of the fire hazard analysis:
guide:
2:2 Fire Prevention
2:2:1 The fire load of the nuclear power plant should be kept at a reasonably practicable minimum value:
Use non-combustible materials as much as possible, otherwise flame-retardant materials should be used:
2:2:2 The number of ignition sources should be minimized:
2:2:3 The design of each system of the nuclear power plant should ensure that it will not be affected by its failure as far as possible:
cause a fire:
2:2:4 For functional failures or malfunctions that may cause unacceptable radioactive material
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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For the released items important to safety, corresponding protective measures should be taken to prevent them from being struck by lightning:
Fire hazard caused by this phenomenon:
2:2:5 Design measures should be taken to properly store the temporary combustible materials in operation, so that the
Keep it away from items important to safety, or take necessary protective measures: nuclear power plant operating stage
For guidance on section fire protection, see the relevant guidelines on fire safety in nuclear power plant operation:
2:3 Automatic fire alarm and extinguishing
2:3:1 Automatic fire alarm system and fire extinguishing system should be set up, as well as fire hazards
other necessary systems as identified by the sex analysis (see Section 3:5): Automatic fire alarm system and extinguishing
The fire system should give an alarm and/or put out the fire promptly in the event of a fire, and put the fire to safety:
Adverse effects on critical items and staff are minimized:
2:3:2 The fire extinguishing system should be able to start automatically when necessary: fire suppression system design and
The layout should ensure that its operation, rupture or misoperation will not affect the structures and systems important to safety
and the function of the components, do not damage the protective measures for critical accidents, do not affect multiple safety
A full range, ensuring that actions taken to meet the single failure criterion are effective:
2:3:3 The possibility of failure of the fire extinguishing system should be considered: should be considered from fire
The impact of system effluents in adjacent locations or adjacent fire protection zones:
2:3:4 In order to ensure the smooth implementation of manual fire-fighting operations, appropriate emergency photos should be set up:
Ming and communication equipment:
2:4 Fire Containment and Mitigation of Fire Consequences
2:4:1 Multiple components of the safety system should be adequately isolated to ensure that fire
Affect one series of safety systems without interfering with another series of redundant setups to perform security
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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Full Function: Each redundant series of safety systems can be located in separate fire zones, or
At least in a separate fire compartment to achieve the above objectives (see Sections 3:3-3:4):
The number of penetrations between fire zones should be minimized:
2:4:2 All areas containing safety systems, as well as other
Analyse the consequences of a hypothetical fire on the parts that constitute the fire hazard: Hypotheses should be assumed in the analysis
The functions of all safety systems in the fire zone or fire zone where the fire is located are completely disabled, except for
Other than this safety system is protected by a certified fire barrier or can withstand the consequences of a fire:
For exceptional cases, the analysis should be justified:
2:4:3 Automatic fire alarm system, fire extinguishing system and its support in each fire zone
Maintenance systems (such as ventilation, drainage, etc:) should be as independent as possible from these systems in other
counterparts in fire zones to maintain the operability of these systems in adjacent fire zones:
2:5 Event Combination
2:5:1 If probabilistic safety analysis can demonstrate that a random event is highly unlikely to occur,
If the occurrence frequency of the combination is so low that it can be ignored, this combination of events may not be regarded as a hypothetical event:
So consider:
2:5:2 The design of fire protection systems and equipment shall take into account fire and other
A combination of hypothetical initiating events for a fire and taking appropriate countermeasures: For example, for
A combination of loss of water and independent fire events should be considered in the long term after the accident:
independent fires, regardless of the short-term phase of the accident and activation of mitigation systems
Superimposed independent fires:
2:5:3 A postulated initiating event should not result in a fire compromising the safety system: should be in
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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Fire hazard analysis identifies possible causes of fire, such as severe seismic events or
If the turbo-generator disintegrates, specific countermeasures should be taken if necessary (such as using cable covering,
Automatic fire alarm system and fire extinguishing system, etc:): In the fire hazard analysis, special
Pay attention to the possibility of failure of high-temperature equipment and pipelines transporting flammable liquids and gases:
2:5:4 The need to maintain its
function (such as integrity, and/or functionality, and/or operability) of the fire protection system and
equipment, properly designed and qualified to withstand a hypothetical initiating event
appropriate ability to affect the event:
2:5:5 For fire protection systems that do not need to maintain their function after a PIE
and equipment, which shall be designed and qualified in such a way that they fail in a manner that does not jeopardize nuclear safety-related
item:
2:6 Protection against explosion hazards
2:6:1 The nuclear power plant shall be designed to eliminate the explosion hazard as far as possible: should be designed
Priority is given to measures to prevent or limit the creation of an explosive atmosphere:
2:6:2 As far as possible, places that may generate or contribute to the generation of explosive gas mixtures should be
Flammable gases, flammable liquids and flammable materials are excluded from fire zones, fire zones, and
Areas adjacent to fire zones and fire compartments, and outside areas connected by ventilation systems:
If this is not possible, the quantity of these materials should be strictly limited and adequate storage facilities should be provided:
application, and isolate active substances, oxidants and combustible materials from each other: Flammable gas compression
Cylinders should be properly stored in a dedicated paddock away from the main building, and should be properly stored according to the local environment:
environmental conditions to provide adequate protection: Consider setting up an automatic fire alarm system, flammable gas
Nuclear power plant fire protection and explosion-proof design
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Automatic detection system and automatic fire extinguishing system to prevent fires from causing explosions to affect other plants
Items important to safety in the room:
2:6:3 Fire zones, fire zones, and explosions should be clearly identified for these areas:
Other areas with significant hazards are identified as explosion hazards: Things to Consider in Identifying Explosion Hazards
physical explosions (such as rapid air expansion caused by high-energy arcs), chemical explosions (such as gas mixing
explosions caused by chemical compounds, oil-filled transformers) and fires, assumptions should also be considered
Effects of initiating events (eg rupture of flammable gas pipelines):
2:6:4 Appropriate electrical components (eg circuit breakers) should be selected and limited by design
The probability, magnitude and duration of the arc that can occur, reducing the hazard of a physical explosion to
minimum:
2:6:5 If the formation of an explosive atmosphere cannot be avoided, appropriate design or
Establish necessary operating procedures to minimize risks, including: limiting explosions
volume of explosive gas, elimination of ignition sources, adequate ventilation, selection suitable for explosive
Environmental electrical equipment, inerting, explosion venting (such as burst panels or other pressure relief devices)
and isolation from items important to safety: The need to maintain after a postulated initiating event should be identified
functional devices, and are properly designed and qualified:
2:6:6 By isolating potentially fire and potentially explosive liquids and gases, or by
Overactive measures (such as fixed water-based fire suppression systems that provide cooling and vapor diffusion) will
The risk of fire-induced explosions (eg, expansion and vaporization of boiling liquids) is minimized: answer
Consider shock wave overpressure and projectiles resulting from the expanding vaporization explosion of the boiling liquid, and
Possibility of igniting a flammable gas far from the point of release causing the gas cloud to explode:
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