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GB/T 34590.10-2022 (GB/T34590.10-2022)

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GB/T 34590.10-2022: PDF in English (GBT 34590.10-2022)

GB/T 34590.10-2022
GB
NATIONAL STANDARD OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ICS 43.040
CCS T 35
Replacing GB/T 34590.10-2017
Road Vehicles - Functional Safety - Part 10: Guideline
(ISO 26262-10:2018, Road Vehicles – Functional Safety – Part 10: Guidelines
on ISO 26262, MOD)
ISSUED ON: DECEMBER 30, 2022
IMPLEMENTED ON: JULY 1, 2023
Issued by: State Administration for Market Regulation;
Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of China.
Table of Contents
Foreword ... 4
Introduction ... 7
1 Scope ... 11
2 Normative References ... 12
3 Terms and Definitions ... 12
4 Key Concepts of GB/T 34590 ... 12
4.1 Functional safety for automotive systems (relationship with GB/T 20438) ... 12
4.2 Item, system, element, component, hardware part and software unit ... 15
4.3 Relationship between faults, errors and failures ... 16
4.4 FTTI and emergency operation tolerant time interval ... 17
5 Selected Topics Regarding Safety Management ... 21
5.1 Work product ... 21
5.2 Confirmation measures ... 22
5.3 Understanding of safety cases ... 25
6 Concept Phase and System Development ... 27
6.1 General ... 27
6.2 Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment ... 27
6.3 An observation regarding controllability classification ... 28
6.4 External measures ... 28
6.5 Example of combining safety goals ... 30
7 Safety Process Requirement Structure - Flow and Sequence of the Safety
Requirements ... 31
8 Concerning Hardware Development ... 34
8.1 The classification of random hardware faults... 34
8.2 Example of residual failure rate and local single-point fault metric evaluation ... 40
8.3 Further explanation concerning hardware ... 54
8.4 PMHF units — Average probability per hour ... 63
9 Safety Element out of Context ... 66
9.1 Safety Element out of Context development ... 66
9.2 Use cases ... 68
10 An Example of Proven in Use Argument ... 77
10.1 General ... 77
10.2 Item definition and definition of the proven in use candidate ... 77
10.3 Change analysis ... 78
10.4 Target values for proven in use ... 78
11 Concerning ASIL Decomposition ... 79
11.1 Objective of ASIL decomposition ... 79
11.2 Description of ASIL decomposition ... 79
11.3 An example of ASIL decomposition ... 80
12 Guidance for System Development with Safety-Related Availability
Requirements ... 83
12.1 Introduction ... 83
12.2 Notes on concept phase when specifying fault tolerance ... 84
12.3 Availability considerations during hardware design phase ... 94
12.4 Software development phase ... 97
13 Remark on “Confidence in the Use of Software Tools” ... 97
14 Guidance on Safety-Related Special Characteristics ... 99
14.1 General ... 99
14.2 Identification of safety-related special characteristics ... 100
14.3 Specification of the control measures of safety-related special characteristics ... 101
14.4 Monitoring of the safety-related special characteristics ... 101
Annex A (Informative) Fault Tree Construction and Applications ... 103
Bibliography ... 106
Foreword
This document was drafted in accordance with the rules provided in GB/T 1.1-2020 Directives
for Standardization - Part 1: Rules for the Structure and Drafting of Standardizing Documents.
This document is Part 10 of GB/T 34590 Road Vehicles - Functional Safety. GB/T 34590 has
issued the following parts:
--- Part 1: Vocabulary;
--- Part 2: Management of Functional Safety;
--- Part 3: Concept Phase;
--- Part 4: Product Development at the System Level;
--- Part 5: Product Development at the Hardware Level;
--- Part 6: Product Development at the Software Level;
--- Part 7: Production, Operation, Service and Decommissioning;
--- Part 8: Supporting Processes;
--- Part 9: Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-oriented and Safety-oriented Analyses;
--- Part 10: Guideline;
--- Part 11: Guidelines on Applications to Semiconductors;
--- Part 12: Adaptation for Motorcycles.
This Document replaced GB/T 34590.10-2017 Road vehicles - Functional safety - Part 10:
Guideline. Compared with GB/T 34590.10-2017, the major technical changes of this Document
are as follows besides the structural adjustment and editorial modifications:
--- Change the scope of application of the standard from "mass-produced passenger cars"
into "mass-produced road vehicles other than mopeds"; and modify the description of
the scope (see Clause 1 of this Edition; Clause 1 of 2017 Edition);
--- Add "FTTI and emergency operation fault tolerance time interval" (see 4.4 of this
Edition);
--- Change the description of the general provisions of the accreditation measures (see 5.2.1
of this Edition; 5.2.1 of 2017 Edition);
--- Change the description of functional safety assessment (see 5.2.2 of this Edition; 5.2.2
of 2017 Edition);
--- Change the description of the understanding of the safety profile (see 5.3 of this Edition;
5.3 of 2017 Edition);
--- Change the description in Figure 8 (see Figure 8 of this Edition; Figure 7 of 2017 Edition);
--- Change the description in Figure 9 (see Figure 9 of this Edition; Figure 8 of 2017 Edition);
--- Change the description of the consideration of exposure duration in the calculation of the
probability measure of random hardware failure (PMHF) (see 8.3.2.2 of this Edition;
8.3.3 of 2017 Edition);
--- Add "typical dual-point failure mode (intended function and safety mechanism)" (see
8.3.2.3 of this Edition);
--- Add "calculation formula" (see 8.3.2.4 of this Edition);
--- Add "PMHF unit --- average probability per hour (see 8.4 of this Edition);
--- Add "Guidelines for the development of systems with safety-related availability
requirements" (see Clause 12 of this Edition);
--- Delete Annex A of 2017 edition.
This Document modifies and adopts ISO 26262-10:2018 Road Vehicles – Functional Safety –
Part 10: Guidelines on ISO 26262.
The technical differences and causes between this Document and ISO 26262-10:2018 are as
follows:
--- Change the subclause structure of 13.3 (see 13.3) [Translator Note: here it shall be 12.3];
so that the subclause structure is more rational.
This Document made the following editorial modifications:
--- Change the paragraph sequence of the Scope;
--- Delete the title of 4.3.1.
Please note some contents of this Document may involve patents. The issuing agency of this
Document shall not assume the responsibility to identify these patents.
This Document was proposed by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of PRC.
This Document shall be under the jurisdiction of National Technical Committee on Auto of
Standardization Administration of China (SAC/TC 114).
Drafting organizations of this Document: China Automotive Technology and Research Center
Co., Ltd.; Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center Co., Ltd.; China FAW Group Co., Ltd.; Hella
Road Vehicles - Functional Safety - Part 10: Guideline
1 Scope
This Document provides an overview of the GB/T 34590 series of standards, as well as giving
additional explanations, and is intended to enhance the understanding of the other parts of this
series of standards. This Document has an informative character only and describes the general
concepts of the GB/T 34590 series of standards in order to facilitate comprehension. The
explanation expands from general concepts to specific contents.
This Document is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more
electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production road
vehicles, excluding mopeds.
This Document does not address unique E/E systems in special vehicles such as E/E systems
designed for drivers with disabilities.
NOTE: Other dedicated application-specific safety standards exist and can complement the ISO 26262
series of standards or vice versa.
Systems and their components released for production, or systems and their components
already under development prior to the publication date of this document, are exempted from
the scope of this edition. This Document addresses alterations to existing systems and their
components released for production prior to the publication of this document by tailoring the
safety lifecycle depending on the alteration. This Document addresses integration of existing
systems not developed according to this document and systems developed according to this
Document by tailoring the safety lifecycle.
This Document addresses possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of safety-related
E/E systems, including interaction of these systems. It does not address hazards related to
electric shock, fire, smoke, heat, radiation, toxicity, flammability, reactivity, corrosion, release
of energy and similar hazards, unless directly caused by malfunctioning behavior of safety-
related E/E systems.
This Document describes a framework for functional safety to assist the development of safety-
related E/E systems. This framework is intended to be used to integrate functional safety
activities into a company-specific development framework. Some requirements have a clear
technical focus to implement functional safety into a product; others address the development
process and can therefore be seen as process requirements in order to demonstrate the capability
of an organization with respect to functional safety.
This document does not address the nominal performance of E/E systems.
In the case of inconsistencies between this Document and another part of the GB/T 34590 series
of standards, the requirements, recommendations and information specified in the other part of
the GB/T 34590 series of standards apply.
2 Normative References
The provisions in following documents become the essential provisions of this Document
through reference in this Document. For the dated documents, only the versions with the dates
indicated are applicable to this Document; for the undated documents, only the latest version
(including all the amendments) is applicable to this Document.
GB/T 34590.1-2022 Road Vehicles - Functional Safety - Part 1: Vocabulary (ISO 26262-1:2018,
MOD)
NOTE: The contents quoted from GB/T 34590.1-2022 have no technical differences with the contents
quoted from ISO 26262-1:2018.
3 Terms and Definitions
For the purposes of this Document, the terms and definitions given in GB/T 34590.1-2022 apply.
4 Key Concepts of GB/T 34590
4.1 Functional safety for automotive systems (relationship with GB/T 20438)
GB/T 20438, Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems, is designated by IEC as a generic standard and a basic safety publication. This means
that industry sectors will base their own standards for functional safety on the requirements of
GB/T 20438.
In the automotive industry, there are a number of issues with applying GB/T 20438 directly.
Some of these issues and corresponding differences in the GB/T 34590 series of standards are
described below.
GB/T 20438 is based upon the model of “equipment under control”, for example an industrial
plant that has an associated control system as follows:
a) A hazard analysis identifies the hazards associated with the equipment under control
(including the equipment control system), to which risk reduction measures will be
applied. This can be achieved through electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
(E/E/PE) systems, or other technology safety-related systems (e.g., a safety valve), or
external measures (e.g. a physical containment of the plant). The GB/T 34590 series of
standards contains a normative automotive scheme for hazard classification based on
5.2.2 Functional safety assessment
If the highest ASIL of the item's safety goals is ASIL C or D, a functional safety assessment is
performed to evaluate an item's achievement of functional safety. In GB/T 34590.2-2022,
certain aspects of a functional safety assessment are described as well as further aspects of
confirmation measures.
The scope of the functional safety assessment is defined in GB/T 34590.2-2022, Clause 6.
In the case a functional safety assessment is performed, the results of the functional safety audit
and of the confirmation reviews are an input for the functional safety assessment. The person
responsible for the assessment can perform the assessment according to his/her discretion,
including how to make use of the results of the functional safety audit and confirmation reviews.
EXAMPLE 1: If the results of the functional safety audit are satisfactory, the person responsible for the
functional safety assessment can decide to rely on the results of the audit, without making a further
judgement of the implementation of the processes required for functional safety.
EXAMPLE 2: Based on the confirmation review report of a particular work product, the person
responsible for the assessment can decide to perform, or to request, a more in-depth review of certain
aspects of that work product, or can check whether the confirmation review sufficiently considered the
interplay between that work product and related work products.
NOTE 1: It is possible that the person responsible for the functional safety assessment performs a
particular confirmation review i.e., a confirmation review is not necessarily performed by a person
different from the person responsible for the assessment.
The assessment on functional safety may be repeated or updated.
EXAMPLE 3: A functional safety assessment update because of a change of the item, or element(s) of
the item, which is identified by the change management as having an impact on the functional safety of
the item (see GB/T 34590.8-2022, Clause 8).
EXAMPLE 4: A functional safety re-assessment that is triggered by a functional safety assessment
report that recommends a conditional acceptance or a rejection of the item's functional safety. In this
case, the iteration includes a follow-up of the recommendations resulting from the previous functional
safety assessment(s), including an evaluation of the performed corrective actions, if applicable.
If the highest ASIL of the item's safety goals is ASIL A or ASIL B, a functional safety
assessment can be omitted or performed less rigorously. However, even if the functional safety
assessment is not performed, other confirmation measures are still performed (see GB/T
34590.2-2022, Table 1).
In the case of a distributed development, the scope of a functional safety assessment includes
the work products generated, and the processes and safety measures implemented, by a vehicle
manufacturer and the suppliers in the item's supply chain (see GB/T 34590.2-2022 and GB/T
34590.8-2022, Clause 5).
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Source: Above contents are excerpted from the PDF -- translated/reviewed by: www.chinesestandard.net / Wayne Zheng et al.