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                    Nuclear power plant seismic design and identification
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                    HAD 102/02-2019
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  Standard similar to HAD10202-2019 HAD 102/10   HAD 102/11   HAD 102/04    
    
  Basic data             |  Standard ID  |          HAD 102/02-2019 (HAD102/02-2019) |               |  Description (Translated English)  |          (Nuclear power plant seismic design and identification) |               |  Sector / Industry  |          Chinese Industry Standard |         
  HAD10202-2019: Nuclear power plant seismic design and identification---This is a DRAFT version for illustration, not a final translation. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.) will be manually/carefully translated upon your order.  
HA D10202-2019
(Nuclear power plant seismic design and identification)
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attachment1
Nuclear Safety Guide HA D 102/02–2019
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
(Approved and released by the National Nuclear Safety Administration on December 31,:2019
National Nuclear Safety Administration
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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1 Introduction
1:1 Purpose
1:1:1 This guideline is a reference to the "Safety Regulations for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants" (HA F102,
Hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") to explain and refine the relevant provisions, the purpose of which is to provide
The overall supervision and management department, nuclear power plant designers and operating organizations
Design and Qualification provides an acceptable general approach so that site vibrations are not endangered
Nuclear power plant safety, and used in the analysis, test and identification of structures and equipment
guidance on the consistency of laws and procedures to meet the safety of the Regulations
Require:
1:1:2 Annex I has the same effect as the main text:
1:2 Scope
1:2:1 This guideline is applicable to those related to the seismic risk assessment of nuclear power plants:
Guidelines for Design of Onshore Stationary Water-Cooled Reactor Nuclear Power Plants Excluding Guidelines to
Resist site-specific earthquakes: This guideline does not address the magnitude of ground motions or nuclear power plants
Risk of each item:
1:2:2 When using simplified procedures for design and verification, it should be demonstrated that these
The suitability of the procedures for achieving the safety objectives and appropriate from the safety point of view
evaluation of:
1:2:3 These Guidelines are applicable to the design and construction of new nuclear power plants, usually
Not for re-evaluation of established nuclear power plants: This guideline does not apply to established cores
Seismic Design Margin Evaluation of Power Plants:
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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1:2:4 The Guidelines may also be used for the design of other types of nuclear power plants, but should be
Apply engineering judgment based on the type of reactor and its special safety requirements
Evaluate its suitability:
1:2:5 Technical advice on modelling and item identification in these Guidelines
It can be applied to the design of vibration caused by other causes other than earthquakes, such as industrial facilities:
Explosions, aircraft strikes, quarry explosions, or accidents with high-speed rotating machinery, etc: but
Yes, such extensions should be used with caution, especially with regard to the frequency range of induced vibration,
In terms of duration, direction and impact mechanism on the nuclear power plant, engineering should be carried out:
process judgment: It should also be noted that designs to resist such loads may use different shapes
(e:g: crash walls), or may include other different forms of failure (e:g: impact loads)
scabbing or cracking caused by loading): These special engineering measures are not considered in this guideline:
2 General
2:1 Overview
2:1:1 In accordance with the requirements in the Regulations, this chapter analyzes structures, systems and
Safety importance of components in design basis seismic events, proposed seismic classification
suggestion: In order to ensure that there is an appropriate safety margin1 in the design, the
Recommendations for the application of accounting standards:
2:1:2 For the impacts on the safety of nuclear power plants covered by the scope of application of this guideline,
For all items, services and processes, quality assurance measures should be developed and implemented effectively:
In this paper, safety margins refer to special conditions in design, material selection, construction, maintenance and quality assurance
payment result:
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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2:2 Design basis earthquake
2:2:1 The seismic hazard shall be assessed for each site and shall be
The target probability level or principle determined by the sequence and nuclear power plant design, giving two levels
Other Design Basis Ground Motions: Operational Safety Ground Motion (SL-1) and Ultimate Safety
Earthquake (SL-2):
2:2:2 In the design of nuclear power plants, SL-2 and the most stringent safety requirements
related, while SL-1 has a different safety significance, which is more likely and serious
It is relatively low and can be determined by the operating unit through comprehensive evaluation: Normally, SL-1 is used for load
load combinations (for reasons related to probability, other events are associated with lower-intensity ground
earthquake combination), post-incident inspections and permit requirements: as a lower level earthquake
SL-1 is generally not related to safety requirements, but only to operational requirements: when the nucleus
When the actual ground motion at the site during the operation of the power plant exceeds SL-1, measures should be taken:
The nuclear power plant safety-related items shall be evaluated according to the relevant requirements:
It is estimated that the nuclear operation can be resumed only after the review and approval of the nuclear safety supervision and management department:
power plant operation:
2:2:3 SL-2 should be considered for each safety class item in nuclear power plant: lowest
The level should be considered equivalent to a free-field ground acceleration peak value of 0:15g (design response spectrum
the value of the zero-cycle acceleration in the middle):
2:2:4 The determination of the design basis ground motion generally considers the frequency of the potential ground motion:
spectrum and duration: When it is judged that there are multiple sources that have a major contribution to the hazard,
In particular, attention should be paid to the spectral effects and duration effects of different sources: in this case
In the case of earthquakes, the response to ground motions (or
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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Spectrum) should be more cautious when enveloping: Taking into account structures, systems and components
The seismic requirements are different, and the bearing capacity should be evaluated separately for different ground motions:
2:2:5 Input ground motions are generally defined at the surface or bedrock surface
field: When seismic input is required at the base elevation, inversion-forward modeling can be used
method to assign a value:
2:3 Seismic classification of structures, systems and components
2:3:1 Any major site expected effects due to earthquakes, related to
Nuclear power plant structures are associated with vibrations transmitted to structures, systems and components: shock
through direct or indirect interaction mechanisms (such as
Mechanical interactions, release of hazardous substances, fire or flooding, operator communication
destruction of roads and unavailability of evacuation or approach roads, etc:) affecting nuclear power
Factory safety features:
2:3:2 All structures, systems and components are subject to any
seismic action, and the required performance during a seismic event may differ from
Safety functions considered in the safety classification: These safety features are based on
The highest safety function is required under the reference conditions (assuming initiating events): therefore
For the design method based on safety, in addition to safety classification, it is also necessary to
Its safety importance during and after an earthquake puts structures, systems and components
sort: The seismic resistance of structures, systems and components can be divided into
Seismic category II and non-nuclear seismic category, or according to the design characteristics of nuclear power plant units
more classes: The purpose of classification is to benefit the public and the environment regarding radioactive material
Release protection and safeguarding nuclear safety:
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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2:3:3 The seismic class I items of nuclear power plants should be specified: Such items should be designed
To withstand SL-2: Seismic Class I items usually correspond to the highest category in terms of safety,
And include all items important to safety: Specifically, the seismic class I items should include the following
List of items and their supporting structures:
(1) As a consequence of SL-2, its failure will directly or indirectly lead to an accident
items of working conditions;
(2) Shut down the reactor, keep the reactor in a shutdown state, and when required
Items required to discharge residual heat during the period, as well as monitoring the parameters of the above functions
items necessary for the test;
(3) Any hypothetical initiating event considered in the prevention or mitigation design (whether
what is the probability of its occurrence) causing the radioactive release to exceed the limit value
item;
(4) Prevent or mitigate the consequences of unacceptable radioactive releases from spent fuel pools;
required items:
2:3:4 The selection of items in Section 2:3:3(3) is related to defense in depth:
During a seismic event at the SL-2 level, all levels of defense should always be available
State 2: Physical barriers designed to protect against external events other than earthquakes, local
Integrity and functionality should be maintained during earthquakes:
2:3:5 Although the main pressure boundary of the LWR primary circuit is based on the seismic load
load, but as a conservative measure, the primary circuit pressure is still assumed
Certain design basis accidents will occur at the boundary and items are provided to mitigate their consequences,
2 In the framework of defense in depth, defenses against all external events are part of the first level of defense in depth:
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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Such items are also included in the seismic class I items:
2:3:6 The design, installation and maintenance of seismic class I items in nuclear power plants shall comply with the
Compliance with strict practice, that is, the safety margins used for facilities with higher than normal risks:
For any seismic class I item, the appropriate
Acceptance Criteria 3 (eg design parameters indicating functionality, tightness or maximum deformation):
However, in some cases, if the detailed evaluation of its effect on the safety function of the nuclear power plant
Effects, for load combinations including SL-2, acceptance criteria for solid barriers can be
appropriately lower:
2:3:7 The seismic class II items of nuclear power plants can be determined: Seismic Class II Items
Should include:
(1) All items with radiological risk but not related to the reactor (such as
fuel plants and radioactive waste plants): required safety margins for these items
consistent with its potential radiological consequences: Since these items are generally different from
related to the release mechanism (e:g: waste leakage, spent fuel cartridge damage), its expected consequences
Different from the potential consequences of the reactor;
(2) It does not belong to the seismic class I especially in Section 2:3:3 (2) and (3)
items’, but for a sufficiently long time (with a reasonable
the possibility of producing SL-2 or SL-1) to prevent or mitigate nuclear power plant accident conditions (by
items required by postulated initiating events other than earthquakes);
3 Acceptance criteria are functional criteria used to evaluate the ability of structures, systems and components to perform their designed functions:
or the boundary value specified by the state index: Acceptance criteria used here are defined as hypothetical initial events:
Boundary values specified for functional or stateful indicators of structures, systems and components (e:g:
performance, tightness or non-interaction related indications):
Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
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(3) Items related to site accessibility and required for implementing emergency evacuation plan
items:
2:3:8 The design seismic level of seismic class II items shall be determined on the following basis:
Decision: Additional work to protect items against this seismic level must be
It is commensurate to reduce the risk to nuclear power plant personnel or the public from earthquakes: must
Adhere to the acceptable limits for the release of radioactive material set by the state:
2:3:9 Non-nuclear seismic-resistant items that do not belong to seismic class I and class II shall be
Design according to the national specification for non-nuclear facilities, that is, facilities with conventional risks:
line design: Some of these items are important to the operation of the nuclear power plant and can be
Select stricter acceptance criteria for line targets: This approach reduces nuclear power plant shutdowns
the need for reactors, inspections and re-licensing so that the nuclear power plant can continue to operate
Row:
2:3:10 Of all items in a nuclear power plant (including those
items), those that may interact spatially with seismic Class I and Seismic Class II items
action (e:g: due to collapse, fall or displacement) or other interaction (e:g: by
Hazardous substance release, fire, flooding or earthquake-induced interactions),
The potential impact and damage caused by these items should be demonstrated, neither affecting any
The safety function of any seismic class I and seismic class II items does not affect any safety features:
All relevant operator actions:
2:3:11 As a consequence of earthquakes, based on analysis, testing or experience, it is expected that
Certain interactions occur and would jeopardize the safety of seismic Class I or Seismic Class II items
function (including operational actions), one of the following measures should be taken:
   
   
  
  
    
  
    
   
        
       
          
               
 
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