|
US$2519.00 ยท In stock
Delivery: <= 10 days. True-PDF full-copy in English will be manually translated and delivered via email.
HAF102-2016: Safety regulation for design of nuclear power plant
| Standard ID | Contents [version] | USD | STEP2 | [PDF] delivered in | Standard Title (Description) | Status | PDF |
| HAF 102-2016 | English | 2519 |
Add to Cart
|
10 days [Need to translate]
|
Safety regulation for design of nuclear power plant
| |
HAF 102-2016
|
Standard similar to HAF102-2016 HAD 002/09 HAD 002/06 HAD 002/01 Basic data | Standard ID | HAF 102-2016 (HAF102-2016) | | Description (Translated English) | Safety regulation for design of nuclear power plant | | Sector / Industry | Chinese Industry Standard | | Word Count Estimation | 63,694 | | Date of Issue | 2016-10-26 | | Date of Implementation | 2016-10-26 | | Older Standard (superseded by this standard) | HAF 102-2004 | | Regulation (derived from) | State Nuclear Safety Announcement (2016) No.265 | | Issuing agency(ies) | State Nuclear Safety Administration | HAF102-2016: Safety regulation for design of nuclear power plant---This is a DRAFT version for illustration, not a final translation. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.) will be manually/carefully translated upon your order.
HA F102-2016
Safety regulation for design of nuclear power plant
- 3 -
Nuclear power plant design safety regulations
(Revised in:2016, approved and released by the National Nuclear Safety Administration on October 26,:2016
1 Introduction
1:1 Purpose
To achieve the safe operation of nuclear power plants, prevent or mitigate events that may endanger safety
Consequences, this regulation proposes the design of structures, systems and components important to the safety of nuclear power plants
requirements, as well as procedures and organizational processes that must be met:
This provision applies to the analysis,
Validation and review, technical support, and nuclear safety oversight:
1:2 Scope
1:2:1 This regulation sets out the requirement to conduct a comprehensive safety assessment to determine the nuclear power
Potential hazards that may arise in the plant under various operating states and accident conditions: Safety has been evaluated
The process involves two complementary techniques, deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis:
A variety of hypothetical initiating events must be considered in the analysis, including those that may affect individually or in combination
many factors of safety: These events are of the following types:
(1) Originating from the operation of the nuclear power plant itself;
(2) Caused by the behavior of personnel;
(3) It is directly related to the nuclear power plant and the site environment:
1:2:2 This regulation does not deal with general industrial safety and by
- 4 -
Non-radioactive effects caused by the operation of nuclear power plants:
1:2:3 The nuclear power plant in this regulation mainly refers to the power generation or other heating applications:
(such as district heating or desalination), onshore solid-state units using water-cooled reactors
Fixed nuclear power plant:
1:2:4 For other types of reactor designs or using innovative technologies, refer to this regulation:
But it should be carefully evaluated and judged:
2 Security objectives and the concept of defense in depth
2:1 Safety goals
2:1:1 Basic safety objective: establishing and maintaining protection against radiological hazards in nuclear power plants
effective defense to protect people and the environment from radioactive hazards:
2:1:2 In order to achieve the basic safety objectives, the following measures must be taken:
(1) Control the radiation exposure to personnel and the release of radioactive substances to the environment under operating conditions
release;
(2) Restrictions that lead to nuclear power plant reactor cores, spent fuel, radioactive waste or any
the possibility of any other radiation source runaway event;
(3) If the above events occur, mitigate the consequences of these events:
2:1:3 The basic safety objectives apply to all activities of a nuclear power plant, including planning, selection
site, design, manufacture, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, and related radioactive materials
transportation, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, etc:
2:2 Radiation protection design
2:2:1 In order to achieve the basic safety objectives, the radiation protection design must ensure that all
- 5 -
Radiation exposure within a nuclear power plant in an operating state or due to any planned emissions from the nuclear power plant
Radiation exposure caused by radioactive material is below the specified limit and as low as reasonably achievable:
At the same time, measures should be taken to mitigate the radiological consequences of any accident:
2:2:2 In order to achieve the basic safety objectives, the radiation protection design must be such that the nuclear power
All sources of radiation exposure in the plant are under the control of strict technical and management measures: but
Limited exposure of personnel is not excluded, nor is it excluded that the amount of radioactive material permitted by regulations is not excluded
Emissions to the environment from an operating nuclear power plant: Such exposures and emissions must be
to be strictly controlled and comply with operational limits and radiation protection standards, and as far as reasonably achievable
low volume:
2:3 Safety Design
2:3:1 The safety design must:
(1) Prevention of harmful consequences due to runaway of the reactor core or other radiation sources
Accidents and, in the event of an accident, mitigating its consequences;
(2) Ensure that the radiological consequences of all accidents considered in the design are below the relevant limits
value and keep it as low as reasonably achievable;
(3) Ensure that the possibility of accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low, and do the best possible
It is possible to mitigate the radiological consequences of such an accident:
2:3:2 In order to demonstrate that the basic safety objectives have been achieved in the design of the nuclear power plant, it is necessary to
A comprehensive safety evaluation of the design shall be carried out to determine the source of all radiation exposure and
Estimates of radiation doses to nuclear power plant workers and the general public, as well as possible exposure to the environment
can affect: Such safety assessment shall consider the following: (1) normal operation of nuclear power plants;
(2) The performance of the nuclear power plant at the predicted operational event; (3) Accident conditions: in the analysis
On the basis, confirm the ability of the design to resist hypothetical initiating events and accidents, and verify that safety is important
- 6 -
Item availability, and inputs to determine contingency plans:
2:3:3 Although measures are taken to control radiation exposure in all operating states
to the lowest possible level that can be reasonably achieved and to minimize the possibility of an accident leading to an uncontrolled radiation source
Small, but there is still a chance of an accident: This requires measures to ensure mitigation
radioactive consequences: These measures include: safety facilities and safety systems, developed by the operating organization
nuclear power plant accident management regulations, as well as off-site interventions formulated by relevant national and local departments
pre-measures:
2:3:4 Practical measures must be taken in the safety design of nuclear power plants to mitigate nuclear and radiation
impact on human life, health and the environment: must actually eliminate the possibility
Nuclear power plant accident sequences resulting in high radiation doses or large radioactive releases; must ensure
After a high-frequency nuclear power plant accident sequence with no or only minor potential radioactivity
fruit: The fundamental goal of safety design is to technically achieve off-site defenses that mitigate radiological consequences:
Protection actions are limited or even cancelable:
2:4 The concept of defense in depth
2:4:1 The main means of preventing accidents in nuclear power plants and mitigating the consequences of accidents are to
With the concept of defense in depth: The concept is implemented in all safety-related activities involving nuclear power
The relevant organization, personnel behavior or design under various power and shutdown states of the plant to ensure this
These activities are placed under the defense of various independent, different layers of measures: even if there is a
When a fault occurs, it will be detected, compensated or corrected by appropriate measures: throughout the design and
Implement defense-in-depth in the industry to deal with various expected operations caused by equipment failures or human factors in the plant:
incidents and accidents, as well as the consequences of external events:
2:4:2 The application of the concept of defense in depth is mainly through a series of continuous and independent defenses:
The combination of protection levels can prevent accidents from causing harm to people and the environment: If at a certain level
- 7 -
If the protection fails, the latter layer provides protection: The independent effectiveness of each layer of defense is
It is a necessary part of defense in depth:
(1) The purpose of the first level of defense is to prevent deviations from normal operation and to prevent safety
item failure: This level requires: according to the appropriate level of quality and proven engineering
Practice, properly and conservatively sit, design, construct, maintain and operate nuclear power plants: for
Therefore, great care should be taken to select appropriate design specifications and materials, and
The construction and commissioning of the power plant is subject to quality control: At this level, reducing internal risk can
Functional design measures contribute to accident prevention: Attention should also be paid to the design, manufacture, construction
processes and procedures for construction, in-service inspection, maintenance and testing, and the
Good accessibility, the way nuclear power plants operate and the use of operating experience: entire
Process to determine detailed analysis of nuclear power plant operation and maintenance requirements and their quality management requirements
as the basis:
(2) The purpose of the second level of defense is to detect and control deviations from normal operating conditions in order to
Prevent projected operational events from escalating into accident conditions: Despite precautions, nuclear power plants are
Certain hypothetical initiating events may still occur during the lifetime: This level requires setting in the design
Install specific systems and facilities, confirm their effectiveness through safety analysis, and formulate operational regulations
processes to prevent the occurrence of these initiating events, or minimize their consequences, so that nuclear
The power plant returned to a safe state:
(3) Setting up a third tier of defense is based on the assumption that, although highly unlikely, some
The escalation of an expected operational event or a postulated initiating event may still not be covered by the previous layer of defense
stopped and turned into an accident: In the design of nuclear power plants, these accidents are assumed to occur:
This requires the use of inherent safety features and/or engineered safety facilities, safety systems
- 8 -
and procedures to prevent radiation that would cause damage to the reactor core or require off-site intervention
Sexual release and return the nuclear power plant to a safe state:
(4) The purpose of the fourth layer of defense is to mitigate the failure of the third layer of defense in depth:
accident consequences: Fourth is achieved by controlling accident progression and mitigating the consequences of severe accidents
layered defense: The safety goal is that, in the event of a severe accident, only the area and time of
Take limited protective actions and avoid or minimize off-site radioactive contamination: this will
Seek that the sequence of events that could lead to an early release or a large release is actually
eliminate:
(5) The fifth level, the final level of defense, is designed to mitigate possible damage caused by accident conditions:
Radiological consequences of potential radioactive releases caused: This level requires appropriate
Emergency facilities, develop emergency plans and emergency procedures for on-site and off-site emergency response:
2:4:3 Another aspect of the application of the defense-in-depth concept is to set up a series of
physical barriers and employ a combination of active, passive and inherent safety features to enable
Physical barriers can effectively contain radioactive material in a specific area: Required Physical Barrier
The number depends on the total amount of radionuclides and the initial source term for the characterization of the isotopic composition, the individual
The effectiveness of the barrier, possible internal and external hazards, and the potential consequences of various failures:
3 Design security management
3:1 Design Safety Management Responsibilities
The operating organization must ensure that the design submitted to the nuclear safety regulatory authority of the State Council conforms to all requirements:
Applicable safety requirements: All groups engaged in important activities related to the safety design of nuclear power plants
Organizations, including design units, have a responsibility to ensure that safety matters are the highest priority:
- 9 -
3:2 Quality Assurance
3:2:1 The management, execution and evaluation describing the nuclear power plant design shall be developed and implemented
The overall arrangement of the quality assurance program: The program includes ensuring that each structure of the nuclear power plant,
Measures of design quality of systems and components and overall design, including determining and correcting the design
Defects, checking the adequacy of the design, and measures to control design changes:
3:2:2 Designs, including changes, modifications or safety improvements, must be
procedures identified in process specifications and standards and must reflect applicable requirements and design basis
standard, the design interface must be determined and controlled:
3:2:3 Whether the design (including design means and design input and output) is appropriate or not,
Verification and confirmation must be done by a person or group other than the person who originally performed the job:
Verification, validation and approval should be completed as early as possible in the design and construction process and no later than the nuclear
The power plant was charged for the first time:
3:3 Maintaining the safety and integrity of the nuclear power plant design throughout its lifetime
3:3:1 The operating organization has overall responsibility for safety: The operating unit must establish a set of positive
system to ensure the safety and integrity of the nuclear power plant design throughout its lifetime:
3:3:2 For the convenience of safety analysis reports, design manuals and other design documents, etc:
The design data of the company is transferred to the operating unit, and a department that is fully responsible for the design process should be established as soon as possible:
And formulate management procedures to be responsible for the design safety of nuclear power plants within the management system of the operating organization
and integrity:
3:3:3 The design work of a nuclear power plant can be shared by many organizations: engineering companies,
Reactor and its auxiliary system suppliers, major equipment suppliers, design sheets for electrical systems
Bits and suppliers of other systems important to the safety of nuclear power plants, etc: The operating unit must
Manage design activities delegated to external organizations:
- 10 -
3:3:4 The department in charge of the design process must ensure that the design of the nuclear power plant satisfies the safety requirements:
Acceptance criteria for integrity, reliability and quality: These guidelines comply with the relevant laws and regulations
regulations and standards: The scope of work and responsibilities must be established and clearly defined to ensure:
(1) The design meets its objectives and meets the requirements of protection and safety optimization, so that the radiation
exposure risk is kept as low as reasonably achievable;
(2) Ways to continuously ensure design safety include design verification, determination of engineering specifications, and
Standards and requirements, use of proven engineering practices, feedback on construction experience, approval of
require engineering documentation, conduct safety assessments and maintain a safety culture;
(3) Equipment required for safe operation, maintenance (including appropriate test cycles) and modifications
Design data should be available and design data should take due account of previous operating experience and experience
certified research results and maintained by the operating organization in an up-to-date state;
(4) Maintain the management of design requirements and status control;
(5) Establish and control the necessary relationship between the responsible designer and the suppliers involved in the design work
Interface;
(6) The operating unit needs to maintain necessary engineering professional data and scientific and technological data;
(7) All design changes are reviewed, verified, documented and approved;
(8) Maintain adequate documentation for future decommissioning of nuclear power plants:
4 Main technical requirements
4:1 Basic safety functions
4:1:1 The following basic safety functions must be ensured in all states of the nuclear power plant:
can:
Tips & Frequently Asked Questions:Question 1: How long will the true-PDF of HAF102-2016_English be delivered?Answer: Upon your order, we will start to translate HAF102-2016_English as soon as possible, and keep you informed of the progress. The lead time is typically 6 ~ 10 working days. The lengthier the document the longer the lead time. Question 2: Can I share the purchased PDF of HAF102-2016_English with my colleagues?Answer: Yes. The purchased PDF of HAF102-2016_English will be deemed to be sold to your employer/organization who actually pays for it, including your colleagues and your employer's intranet. Question 3: Does the price include tax/VAT?Answer: Yes. Our tax invoice, downloaded/delivered in 9 seconds, includes all tax/VAT and complies with 100+ countries' tax regulations (tax exempted in 100+ countries) -- See Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs): List of DTAs signed between Singapore and 100+ countriesQuestion 4: Do you accept my currency other than USD?Answer: Yes. If you need your currency to be printed on the invoice, please write an email to [email protected]. In 2 working-hours, we will create a special link for you to pay in any currencies. Otherwise, follow the normal steps: Add to Cart -- Checkout -- Select your currency to pay.
|