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GM
CRYPTOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY STANDARD
ICS 35.030
CCS L 80
Replacing GM/T 0011-2012
Trusted computing - Trusted computing functionality and
interface specification of cryptographic support platform
Issued on: DECEMBER 04, 2023
Implemented on: JUNE 01, 2024
Issued by. State Cryptographic Administration
Table of Contents
Foreword... 4
Introduction... 7
1 Scope... 8
2 Normative references... 8
3 Terms and definitions... 9
4 Abbreviations... 13
5 Overview of trusted computing cryptographic support platform... 14
5.1 Trusted computing... 14
5.2 Trusted components... 14
5.3 Trusted computing base... 14
5.4 Trusted boundary... 14
5.5 Trusted Transfer... 15
5.6 Trusted authorization... 15
6 Functions of trusted computing cryptographic support platform... 15
6.1 Platform architecture... 16
6.2 Platform interface functions... 18
7 Trusted cryptographic module interface... 26
7.1 General requirements... 26
7.2 Startup command... 26
7.3 Detection command... 27
7.4 Session command... 29
7.5 Object command... 31
7.6 Copy command... 39
7.7 Asymmetric algorithm commands... 43
7.8 Symmetric algorithm command... 47
7.9 Random number generator command... 48
7.10 Hash/HMAC Commands... 49
7.11 Certify command... 54
7.12 Temporary EC key command... 58
7.13 Signature and signature verification commands... 60
7.14 Measurement command... 62
7.15 Enhanced authorization command... 64
7.16 Hierarchical commands... 74
7.17 Dictionary attack command... 80
7.18 Management function commands... 81
7.19 Context management command... 82
7.20 Property commands... 85
7.21 NV operation command... 86
8 Trusted cryptographic module verification method... 95
Trusted computing - Trusted computing functionality and
interface specification of cryptographic support platform
1 Scope
This document gives the system framework and functional principles of the trusted
computing cryptographic support platform; specifies the interface specifications of the
trusted cryptographic module; describes the corresponding verification methods.
This document is applicable to the research, production, evaluation and application
development of products related to the trusted computing cryptographic support
platform.
2 Normative references
The contents of the following documents constitute the essential terms of this document
through normative references in the text. Among them, for referenced documents with
dates, only the version corresponding to that date applies to this document; for
referenced documents without dates, the latest version (including all amendments)
applies to this document.
GB/T 20518 Information security technology - Public key infrastructure - Digital
certificate format
GB/T 25069 Information security techniques - Terminology
GB/T 32905 Information security techniques - SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm
GB/T 32907 Information security technology - SM4 block cipher algorithm
GB/T 32915 Information security technology - Randomness test methods for binary
sequence
GB/T 32918.2 Information security technology - Public key cryptographic
algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves - Part 2.Digital signature algorithm
GB/T 32918.3 Information security technology - Public key cryptographic
algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves - Part 3.Key exchange protocol
GB/T 32918.4 Information security technology - Public key cryptographic
algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves - Part 4.Public key encryption algorithm
GB/T 35276 Information security technology - SM2 cryptography algorithm usage
specification
GM/T 0012 Trusted computing - Trusted computing interface specification of
trusted cryptography module
GM/T 0058 Trusted computing - TCM service module interface specification
GM/Z 4001 Cryptographic terminology
3 Terms and definitions
The terms and definitions defined in GB/T 25069 and GM/Z 4001, as well as the
following terms and definitions, apply to this document.
3.1
Storage master key
The primary key used to protect operating system keys and user keys.
3.2
Trusted computing platform
A support system built in a computing system to implement trusted computing
functions.
3.3
Cryptographic support platform for trusted computing
An important component of a trusted computing platform, including cryptographic
algorithms, key management, certificate management, cryptographic protocols,
cryptographic service content, providing cryptographic support for the integrity,
identity authenticity, data confidentiality of the trusted computing platform itself.
3.4
Root of trust for measurement
A trusted integrity measurement unit, which is the basis for trusted measurement
within a trusted computing platform.
Note. The root of trust for measurement is implemented or composed of hardware, firmware,
software, etc.
3.5
SRTM. Static Root of Trust Measurement
TBB. Trusted Building Block
TCB. Trusted Computing Base
TCM. Trusted Cryptography Module
TSM. TCM Service Module
UEFI. Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
5 Overview of trusted computing cryptographic support
platform
5.1 Trusted computing
Trusted computing is a comprehensive information security technology, which is
designed to enhance the trustworthiness of computer systems. Trusted technology
establishes a trusted root in a computer system, starting from the trusted root to the
hardware platform, to the operating system, then to the application, measures,
authenticates, trusts step by step, extending this trust to the entire computer system,
taking protective measures to ensure the integrity of computing resources and the
predictability of computing behavior, thereby improving the trustworthiness of the
computer system.
5.2 Trusted components
A trusted component consists of one or a group of components that can complete the
instantiation of a trusted root.
5.3 Trusted computing base
The trusted computing base (TCB) is the system hardware and software resources
responsible for maintaining the system security policy. An important attribute of the
TCB is that it shall prevent itself from being damaged by any hardware or software that
does not belong to the TCB.
5.4 Trusted boundary
The trusted component (TBB) and the trusted root constitute the trusted boundary,
which includes entities that measure, store, and report the integrity of the computer's
minimum configuration. In more complex systems, trust shall be extended to other code
by measuring other code based on the Core root of trust for measurement (CRTM) and
recording the measurement results in the Platform Configuration Register (PCR).
5.5 Trusted Transfer
Trusted transfer is the process of measuring the measured modules one by one based on
the Trusted Root and extending the trust chain.
Trusted transfer shall be achieved by TCM supporting one of the following two methods.
a) An operation performed in accordance with the security policy to allow
subsequent operations to obtain control of the TCB;
b) For the measurement of subsequent operations, an independent evaluation of the
trust relationship is established.
5.6 Trusted authorization
When the root of trust for measurement (RTM) begins to execute the core root of trust
for measurement (CRTM), its correctness is guaranteed by the producer of the trusted
component.
When the system executes code outside the core root of trust for measurement, the trust
chain can be maintained by measuring the trust of the code. If the execution of code
depends on its trust measurement, the execution authorization of the code will remain
unchanged.
The following are two different methods that allow the evaluation of the trust rights of
the platform.
a) Measure the code (hash calculation) and record the measurement value in the root
of trust for storage (RTS). If the code does not consider its measurement value
when running, its trust authorization comes from the digest value provided by the
root of trust for reporting (RTR).
b) Sign the code and determine whether the code is trustworthy by verifying the
signature. If its identity is recorded in the RTS, then this assessment can be
modified.
6 Functions of trusted computing cryptographic support
reports to it. The only interaction between TCM and the system is through the interface
defined in this document.
6.1.4 TCM service module
The trusted cryptographic module defines a subsystem with storage protection and
execution protection, which will establish a trusted root for the computing platform; its
independent computing resources will establish a strictly isolated security protection
mechanism. The functions that need to be executed and those that do not need to be
executed in the subsystem shall be separated; the functions that do not need to be
executed shall be executed by the main processor of the computing platform; these
supporting functions constitute the TCM service module.
Note. This document only describes the functional principle of the TCM service; it does not
involve the TCM service module interface specification. The TCM service module interface
specification can be found in GM/T 0058.
The TCM service mainly provides support for users to use TCM basic resources. It
consists of multiple parts; the interface definition between each part shall be
interoperable. The TCM service shall provide a standardized function interface.
The design goals of the TCM service are as follows.
a) Provide an entry point for applications to call TCM security protection functions;
b) Provide synchronous access to TCM;
c) Hide the complexity of TCM function commands from applications;
d) Manage TCM resources.
6.2 Platform interface functions
6.2.1 Trusted root
The trusted root is the trusted base point of the trusted computer and the base point for
implementing security controls. The trusted root provides the minimum functions
required to describe the characteristics of the platform's trustworthiness.
There are three trusted roots in the trusted computing cryptographic support platform.
the root of trust for measurement (RTM), the root of trust for storage (RTS), the root of
trust for reporting (RTR).
a) RTM is the base point for trusted measurement of the platform. RTM sends
integrity information to RTS. When a new trust chain is established, the first set
of instructions executed is the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM). When
the system is reset, the CPU starts executing CRTM. Then, CRTM sends a
measurement value indicating its identity to RTS. This establishes the starting
point of the trust chain.
b) RTS is the base point for secure storage of trusted measurement values. TCM
internal storage cannot be unauthorizedly accessed by external entities; TCM can
serve as RTS. TCM can prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information;
TCM can also store some non-sensitive information.
c) RTR is the base point for the platform to provide platform credibility status reports
to access objects. RTR reports on RTS content; RTR reports are signed reports of
selected content in TCM.
TCM contains an encrypted identity that can be verified by RTR. This identity is
expressed in the form of an endorsement key or an endorsement certificate. The seed
generated by the endorsement key is bound to each chip, so two TCMs will not have
the same endorsement key.
The trusted computing platform provides at least three trusted roots described above.
RTM, RTS, RTR. All three roots use authentication and proof to provide evidence of
information. The trusted computing platform will also provide protected storage for
trusted keys and data objects. The trusted computing platform can provide integrity
measurements to ensure the trustworthiness of the platform.
6.2.2 Attestation and certification
6.2.2.1 Attestation methods
6.2.2.1.1 Classification
The trusted computing platform provides the following attestation methods.
a) In the first category, an external entity attests to the TCM, which shall comply
with this document. This attestation is based on the endorsement key in the TCM.
b) In the second category, an external entity authenticates the platform to ensure that
the platform contains the RTM, the authentic TCM.
c) In the third category, the "certifying CA" attests to the asymmetric key pair in the
TCM, to ensure that the key is protected by the TCM and has specific intrinsic
properties. This attestation takes the form of a certificate, to provide guarantees
for information including the public key of the key pair.
d) In the fourth category, the trusted computing platform attests to the asymmetric
key pair, to ensure that the key pair is protected by the TCM and has specific
intrinsic properties. This authentication method takes the form of signing the
information describing the key pair in the platform's TCM, using the
authentication key protected by the TCM, and a type authentication that provides
a guarantee for the authentication key.
e) Category 5, the trusted computing platform attests the measurement to ensure that
a specific software/firmware state exists in the platform. This attestation method
uses the authentication key protected by the TCM, to sign the software/firmware
measurement value in the PCR.
f) Category 6, the external entity attests the software/firmware measurement. This
authentication takes the form of a credential that signs the information including
the measurement value and state.
6.2.2.1.2 Attestation key and attestation key identity certificate
The authentication of categories 3 and 4 above requires the use of a key to sign the
content of the TCM shielded location.
a) Attestation key (AK) is the platform identity key. The AK is a special type of
signing key, whose use is restricted to prevent forgery (the signature of external
data has the same format as the real authentication data). When the TCM is to
create a signed message, a special value is used from within the TCM as the
message header. When using AK to sign a digest, the caller provides a ticket so
that TCM shall determine that the message used to create the digest cannot be
forged TCM authentication data. The value signed by AK can be guaranteed to
reflect the TCM state, but AK can also be used for general signing purposes.
b) Proof of key identity certificate. TCM users can create limited-use signing keys
based on TCM and require a third-party CA to provide them with a key identity
certificate. The CA can require the caller to provide some evidence to prove that
the authenticated key is a TCM resident key, before providing an identity
certificate.
6.2.2.2 Platform identity
The trusted computing cryptographic support platform uses an endorsement key (EK)
to identify its identity. Under the authorization of EK, an asymmetric key pair is
generated inside TCM as AK, which is used to digitally sign information inside TCM,
realize platform identity authentication and platform integrity report, thus proving the
credibility of the platform's internal data to the outside.
EK shall be stored in TCM and used only when obtaining endorsement key
authorization operations and applying for platform identity certificates; it shall not be
exported outside TCM.
The endorsement key certificate is signed by a trusted party before the platform is used
to establish a one-to-one correspondence between EK and trusted cryptographic module
instances.
A trusted computing cryptographic support platform can generate multiple AKs, each
of which is bound to EK and represents the platform identity to the outside world.
6.2.3 Protected locations
6.2.3.1 Overview
The protected location uses multiple seeds and keys for encryption, which never leave
the TCM. One of them is the context key. It is a symmetric key used to encrypt data
when it is temporarily exchanged out of the TCM, in order to load a different set of
working objects. Other sensitive values that never leave the TCM are primary seeds,
which are the roots of the storage hierarchy that protects objects retained by the
application. The primary seed is used to generate random numbers for protection keys
for other objects. these objects may be storage keys containing protection keys. The
primary seeds may be changed; when they are changed, the objects derived from them
will no longer be available.
6.2.3.2 Key management functions
Key management includes the following functions.
a) Key generation. Key generation refers to the application layer software setting the
key attributes, key use authorization, key migration authorization, key protection
operation key of the required generated key, sending them to the TCM to generate
the specified key. In the TCM, the private key part of the generated key is
encrypted by the protection operation key, then the generated key data structure
is returned to the application layer software. For various types of keys in the TCM,
the generation methods include.
● EK is generated by the manufacturer and is an asymmetric key;
● When the platform owner generates the storage master key, it shall be generated
inside the trusted cryptographic module;
● The platform identity key is an asymmetric key and shall be generated inside
the TCM. The trusted party shall apply for the corresponding platform identity
certificate and activate the key;
● The user key can be generated inside the trusted cryptographic module or
imported after being generated outside the trusted cryptographic module. The
user key can be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.
b) Key loading. After the key is generated, when the application layer software uses
the key for data security protection operations, if the private key of the key is used,
the key data shall be loaded into the TCM and can only be used after being
decrypted by the protection operation key. If the public key of the key is used, it
can be used directly in the application layer software. The loading methods of
various keys in the trusted cryptographic module include.
● When using the TCM key public key, the authorization shall not be verified
before setting the platform owner. After setting the platform owner, the owner
authorization shall be verified; the cryptographic algorithm operation process
shall be performed inside the TCM;
● When using the storage master key, the storage master key authorization shall
be verified; the cryptographic algorithm operation process shall be performed
inside the TCM;
● When using the platform identity key AK, the platform identity key
authorization and storage master key authorization shall be verified; the private
key of the platform identity key shall be loaded into the TCM for cryptographic
algorithm operation; the cryptographic algorithm operation process of the
public key shall be performed outside the TCM;
● When using the platform encryption key, the platform encryption key
authorization and storage master key authorization shall be verified; the private
key of the platform encryption key shall be loaded into the trusted
cryptographic module for cryptographic operation; the cryptographic
operation process of the public key shall be performed outside the module;
● When using the user key, the user key authorization shall be verified; the private
key of the user key shall be loaded into the TCM for cryptographic operation.
c) Key destruction. After the key is generated, the application layer software can
destroy the specified key. For various keys in TCM, the destruction method is as
follows.
● Destroying EK is completed by revoking revocable EK. Irrevocable EK cannot
be destroyed;
● Destroying the storage master key shall verify the storage master key
authorization before executing it in TCM;
● Destroying the platform identity key shall verify the platform identity key
authorization and storage master key authorization, before executing it in the
trusted cryptographic module;
● Destroying the platform encryption key shall verify the platform encryption key
authorization and storage master key authorization, before executing it in the
trusted cryptographic module;
● Destroying the user key needs to verify its protection operation key
authorization, before executing it in the TCM service module.
After the integrity measurement value storage operation of the last component is
completed, the value obtained is the integrity measurement value of the
component sequence stored in the PCR.
6.2.4.3 Integrity report
Integrity report refers to the process of the platform providing the integrity
measurement value of the platform or some components to the verifier. The integrity
report shall meet the following requirements.
a) The platform shall provide the verifier with the specified PCR value without any
authorization;
b) The platform shall provide the verifier with the specified PCR value and the
signature of the PCR value; the signature shall use the platform identity key;
c) The platform can provide the verifier with the associated event log information of
the specified PCR;
d) The verifier can determine whether the PCR value comes from the correct
measurement process, by analyzing the integrity measurement event log
information;
e) The verifier shall use the platform identity key to verify the PCR value signature
and obtain the platform integrity report result.
6.2.4.4 Trust chain
The trust chain is used to ensure the integrity of the platform. The establishment of the
platform trust chain starts with the root of trust for measurement.
First, measure the integrity of other components of BIOS; store the measurement values
in the PCR of the trusted cryptographic module. According to the selected judgment
mechanism, judge the integrity of BIOS. If the integrity is not damaged, run BIOS;
measure the integrity of the initialization program loader (IPL)/master boot record
(MBR). The integrity of IPL/MBR can also be judged, based on the judgment
mechanism. If the integrity of IPL/MBR is not damaged, run MBR; then measure the
integrity of OS kernel by IPL/MBR; after OS kernel is started, detect the integrity of
OS service based on the same mechanism. Through the transmission of trust
relationship, it can be ensured that the started system is trustworthy. If the integrity of
a component is found to be damaged in the above process, report the problem and
perform operations according to the specified policy.
......
Source: Above contents are excerpted from the full-copy PDF -- translated/reviewed by: www.ChineseStandard.net / Wayne Zheng et al.
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