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Delivery: <= 3 days. True-PDF full-copy in English will be manually translated and delivered via email. GB/T 30175-2013: Safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 in the design of safety-related control systems Status: Valid
Basic dataStandard ID: GB/T 30175-2013 (GB/T30175-2013)Description (Translated English): Safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 in the design of safety-related control systems Sector / Industry: National Standard (Recommended) Classification of Chinese Standard: J09 Classification of International Standard: 13.110 Word Count Estimation: 17,181 Adopted Standard: ISO/TR 23849-2010, IDT Regulation (derived from): National Standards Bulletin No. 25 of 2013 Issuing agency(ies): General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China, Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China Summary: This standard provides guidance on how applications GB 28526 and GB/T 16855. 1 design of safety-related control systems. This standard applies to all safety-related control system components, regardless of what type of energy its use, such as electricity, GB/T 30175-2013: Safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 in the design of safety-related control systems---This is a DRAFT version for illustration, not a final translation. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.) will be manually/carefully translated upon your order. Safety of machinery -- Guidance on the application of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 in the design of safety-related control systems ICS 13.110 J09 National Standards of People's Republic of China Mechanical safety application GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 Guidelines for Designing Safety-Related Control Systems Safetyofmachinery-GuidanceontheapplicationofGB/T 16855.1and GB 28526inthedesignofsafety-relatedcontrolsystems (ISO /T R23849.2010, Guidance on the application of ISO 13849 and IEC 62061inthedesignofsafety-relatedcontrolsystemsformachinery, IDT) Published on.2013-12-17 2014-10-01 Implementation General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China Released by the Standardization Administration of China directory Preface III Introduction IV 1 Scope 1 2 Overview 1 3 Standard Comparison 1 4 Risk estimation and designation of required performance2 5 Safety Requirements Specification 2 6 Performance target designation. PL and SIL 2 7 System Design 3 7.1 General requirements for system design using GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 3 7.2 Estimation of PFHD and MTTFd and Use for Troubleshooting 3 7.3 Use subsystems or SRP/CS conforming to GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 for system design 4 7.4 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS designed to other standards 4 8 Example 4 8.1 Overview 4 8.2 Simplified example of design and validation of a safety-related control system performing specified safety-related control functions4 8.3 Conclusion 10 Reference 12 Mechanical safety application GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 Guidelines for Designing Safety-Related Control Systems 1 ScopeThis standard specifies guidelines on how to apply GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.11) to design safety-related control systems. 1) This standard considers GB/T 16855.1-2008, not GB/T 16855.1-2005 which has been replaced by it. This standard applies to all safety-related components of control systems, regardless of the type of energy used, such as electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic , mechanical, etc.2 Overview2.1 GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 both specify the requirements for the design and use of safety-related control systems. these two standards The methods given are different, but if used correctly, all can achieve similar levels of risk reduction. 2.2 Both standards classify safety-related control systems that perform safety functions according to the probability of dangerous failure per hour. GB/T 16855.1 is divided into five performance levels (PL). a, b, c, d and e, while GB 28526 is divided into three safety integrity levels (SIL). 1, 2 and 3. 2.3 The technical committee (TC) of the product standard (C standard) specifies the safety requirements for safety-related control systems and recommends these technical The technical committee defines the level of the safety system according to PL and SIL. 2.4 The mechanical designer can choose to use GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 according to the specific application characteristics. 2.5 The choice and use of which standard may need to be determined by factors such as. --- Previous knowledge and experience in designing machinery safety-related control systems are based on the categories given in GB/T 16855.1-2005 , it is more appropriate to use GB/T 16855.1-2008; --- When the safety-related control system is not based on electrical technology, it is more appropriate to use GB/T 16855.1-2008; --- When the customer needs to use SIL to describe the safety integrity of the machine safety-related control system, it is more appropriate to use GB 28526; --- When the machine safety-related control system is used in the process industry and other fields, the safety-related system at this time (such as conforming to GB/T 21109) Safety Instrumented System) is characterized by SIL, it is more appropriate to use GB 28526.3 Standard Comparison3.1 Compare the technical requirements of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 according to the following aspects. ---the term; --- risk estimation and performance allocation; --- Specification of safety requirements; --- system integrity requirements; ---Diagnostic function; --- Software security requirements. 3.2 In addition, a study was conducted on how the probability of dangerous failure (PFHD) and MTTFd were determined by simplified mathematical formulations according to these two criteria. Evaluation. 3.3 The above work draws the following conclusions. ---By integrating uncomplicated safety-related electrical control systems designed in accordance with GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 respectively (SRECS) subsystems or control system safety-related parts (SRP/CS), which can be designed using either of the two standards Safety-related control systems to acceptable levels of functional safety. --- By integrating electrical/electronic/programmable electronic subsystems designed in accordance with GB/T 20438, these two standards can also be used to provide Design solutions for complex SRECS and SRP/CS. ---At present, users in the machinery industry can use these two standards, and experience shows that they will get great benefits. within a certain stage, Feedback on the actual application of these two standards will promote international standards equivalent to GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 A merger of IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1. --- There are still differences in details, and some concepts (such as functional safety management) need further study to achieve their respective design methods and some technical requirements.4 Risk estimation and specification of required performance4.1 The methods used to determine the SIL and/or PLr of a specific safety function have been compared, and each standard in Annex A of each standard has been identified. There is a good correspondence between the self-given methods. 4.2 Regardless of the method used, it is important to take care to ensure that appropriate SIL and/or PLr of the specific safety function. Usually, this judgment is best made by relevant personnel (eg, designers, maintainers, operators) jointly Participate to ensure a correct understanding of possible hazards on the machine. 4.3 More information on risk estimation and performance determination process can be found in GB/T 15706 and GB/T 20438.5.5 Specification of safety requirements5.1 The respective methods of GB/T 16855.1 and GB 28526 are required in the first stage to specify the safety requirements performed by the safety-related control system Features. 5.2 Each safety function performed by the control circuit should be evaluated, such as using Appendix A of GB/T 16855.1 or Appendix A of GB 28526. Record A. It should be determined how much risk reduction is required for each specific safety function of the machine, and then the amount of risk required for the control loop to perform the safety function. grade. 5.3 The levels specified in PL and/or SIL relate to specific safety functions. 5.4 The information relevant to the safety function that should be given by the product standard (Criterion C) is given below. Safety functions performed by the control circuit. name of safety function Description of the function Performance level required to comply with GB/T 16855.1.PLra~e and/or Safety Integrity Level required to comply with GB 28526.SIL1~3 6 Performance target designation. PL and SIL Table 1 presents the relationship between PL and SIL based on the average probability of dangerous failure per hour. However, in addition to these the same applies to In addition to the probabilistic objectives for safety-related control systems, both standards specify other requirements (such as system safety integrity levels). these requirements The stringency is related to the respective PL and SIL.7 System Design7.1 General requirements for system design using GB 28526 and GB/T 16855.1 When designing SRECS and SRP/CS, the following aspects should be considered. --- When used within the respective limits of the two standards, either standard can be used to design a safety device with acceptable safety functions. Relevant control system, expressed in terms of achieved SIL or PL. ---Uncomplicated safety-related components designed according to the relevant PL of GB/T 16855.1 can be integrated as a subsystem to GB 28526 designed SRECS. Any complex safety-related components designed in accordance with the relevant PL of GB/T 16855.1 Can be integrated into SRP/CS designed in accordance with GB/T 16855.1. --- Any uncomplicated subsystem designed in accordance with the relevant SIL of GB 28526 can be integrated as a safety-related component in accordance with In the composition of SRP/CS designed in GB/T 16855.1. ---Complex subsystems designed according to the relevant SIL of GB/T 20438 can be integrated as safety-related components in accordance with In the SRP/CS designed in GB/T 16855.1, or as a subsystem integrated into the SRECS designed in accordance with GB 28526. 7.2 Estimation of PFHD and MTTFd and Use for Troubleshooting 7.2.1 PFHD and MTTFd 7.2.1.1 The MTTFd value in GB/T 16855.1 is GB 28526 only when it relates to a single-channel SRP/CS without diagnostics Reciprocal of PFHD in. 7.2.1.2 MTTFd is a parameter of one or more components and/or a single channel regardless of any given factor (such as diagnostics and structure), Whereas PFHD is a parameter of the subsystem that takes into account various factors such as diagnostics and structure dependent on the design framework. 7.2.1.3 Appendix K of GB/T 16855.1 gives the classification of different structures of SRP/CS by category and diagnostic coverage (DC). Relationship between MTTFd and PFHD. 7.2.1.4 For the combination of series SRP/CS conforming to GB/T 16855.1, its PFHD can also be estimated according to GB 28526 neutron system. In a similar way to the system, that is, by accumulating the PFHD value of each SRP/CS (such as the value from Annex K of GB/T 16855.1) to complete. 7.2.2 Use of Troubleshooting 7.2.2.1 Both standards allow troubleshooting, see 6.7.7 of GB 28526 and 7.3 of GB/T 16855.1.For requirements up to SIL3 And SRECS without hardware fault margin, GB 28526 does not allow troubleshooting. 7.2.2.2 The correctness and effectiveness of troubleshooting is very important for the life expectancy of the SRP/CS or SRECS. 7.2.2.3 Generally, when the safety function performed by the SRP/CS or SRECS is specified as PLe or SIL3, the This performance level is not normal. It depends on the technology used and the intended use environment. Therefore, when the PL or SIL is increased, the design Users need to pay special attention to the use of troubleshooting. 7.2.2.4 When designing SRP/C or SRECS, in order to achieve PLe or SIL3, troubleshooting is usually not applicable to electromechanical position switches and Mechanical part of a manual switch such as an emergency stop device. Troubleshooting that can be applied in special mechanical failure situations (eg wear/corrosion, cracks) Given in GB/T 16855.2. 7.2.2.5 For example, since faults such as damage to switch actuators cannot usually be troubleshooted, in order to achieve PLe or SIL3, it has been implemented. A minimum fault margin of 1 is required for current PLe or SIL3 door interlocking systems (such as two conventional mechanical position switches). However, according to the phase In the control panel of the standard design, the elimination of faults such as short circuits may be acceptable. 7.2.2.6 More information on usage troubleshooting will be given in the revised GB/T 16855.2. 7.3 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS conforming to GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 7.3.1 In any case, the subsystem or SRP/CS designed in accordance with GB/T 16855.1 or GB 28526 shall only meet all the system requirements. The requirements of the system-level (relevant) standard can be declared to comply with the corresponding system-level standard. 7.3.2 When designing subsystems or components of SRP/CS, they should meet GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 respectively. If every standard has to To be fully satisfied, these standards shall be fully followed. 7.3.3 When designing subsystems or components of SRP/CS, it is not allowed to mix some requirements of these two standards. 7.4 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS designed to other standards 7.4.1 During the design process, it may be necessary to select subsystems that meet other criteria, which conform to relevant product standards and Any one of GB/T 20438, GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1, such as electro-sensitive protective devices. vendors of such subsystems The necessary information should be provided to facilitate the integration of these systems into safety-related control systems that comply with GB 28526 or GB/T 16855.1 System. 7.4.2 According to GB 28526 (also see 6.7.3 of GB 28526) and GB/T 16855.1, it meets the requirements of GB/T 20438 and has been Subsystems designed to product standards (eg IEC 61800-5-2), such as adjustable speed electrical drives, can be used in safety-related control systems. 7.4.3 According to GB 28526, other subsystems that have been designed according to other standard design standards meet the requirements of GB 28526, 6.7.3.8 Examples8.1 Overview The following examples assume all requirements in both standards have been met. Examples are only used to demonstrate specific aspects of standard applications. 8.2 Simplified example of the design and validation of a safety-related control system performing the specified safety-related control functions 8.2.1 This simplified example is used to demonstrate how to use a subsystem or SRP/CS conforming to GB 28526 and/or GB/T 16855.1.Book The example is based on the execution of a safety function, which is a safety-related stop function linked to the position monitoring of a movable guard, The given safety integrity level is SIL3/the required performance level is PLre, see Figure 1. 8.2.2 The following information is relevant to the specification of the safety requirements for this example. security function ---Safety-related stop function triggered by protective device. open the movable protective device to trigger the STO safety function (safe torque off remove). Function description ---Through the movable guard (protective fence) to protect the immersion danger. The position of the combination of two moving break contacts/moving open contacts The switch B1/B2 detects the opening of the interlocking guard and evaluates it via the main safety module K1.K1 drives Q1 and Q2 Two contactors that interrupt or prevent a dangerous movement or state of contactor opening. --- For fault detection, K1 monitors the rationality of the position switch. Faults in Q1 and Q2 are carried out by the start-up test in K1 detection. The start command is valid only when Q1 and Q2 have been reliably cut off. Start-up testing by opening and closing interlocks Trial is not required. --- In the event of component failure, the safety function remains intact. Q1 during operation or actuation (opening and closing) of interlocked guards and Q2 are reliably cut off, and inoperable when a fault is detected. Interlock guard during operation or actuation (open and close) If a fault is detected when set, Q1 and Q2 will be cut off and the operation will be invalid. --- During the time period between two consecutive drives, the accumulation of more than two faults can lead to the loss of safety functions. 8.2.3 The following characteristics should also be given. ---Follow basic and proven safety principles (such as the load current of contactors Q1 and Q2 is reduced by a factor of 50% rated current), and meet the requirements of class B. Equipped with protective circuits (eg contact protection). --- The stable arrangement of the protection device is used to ensure the action of the drive position switch. --- Switch B1 is a position switch with direct opening action in accordance with GB 14048.5-2008, Appendix K. --- Separate the wires of position switches B1 and B2, or protect them. 8.2.4 During the design process of each part of the SRP/CS, the following information can be obtained from the manufacturer. --- The manufacturer declares that the safety module K12) meets the requirements of Category (Cat.) 4, PLe and SILCL3. --- Contactors Q1 and Q2 are basic components with mechanical connections, and meet GB 14048.5-2008, Appendix L. 8.2.5 The following observations may be made regarding the design of the SRP/CS and/or SRECS. --- Only when several mechanical position switches for different protection devices are not connected in series (ie no cascade), can category 4 be achieved. This is necessary, otherwise a fault in the switch cannot be detected. 8.2.6 Calculate failure probability according to GB/T 16855.1 Figure 2 shows the logic subsystem (safety module K1) connected to the dual-channel input and output elements. Since security-related The order of the hardware and thus the subsystems in the block diagram is in principle interchangeable. Therefore, it is recommended to group subsystems of the same structure, such as shown in Figure 3.This can reduce the time limit of single-channel MTTFd to 100 years, enabling PL calculation simplification in the estimation process. ......Tips & Frequently Asked Questions:Question 1: How long will the true-PDF of GB/T 30175-2013_English be delivered?Answer: Upon your order, we will start to translate GB/T 30175-2013_English as soon as possible, and keep you informed of the progress. The lead time is typically 1 ~ 3 working days. 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