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GB/T 21562.2-2015: Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Guide to the application for safety Delivery: 9 seconds. True-PDF full-copy in English & invoice will be downloaded + auto-delivered via email. See step-by-step procedure Status: Valid
Similar standardsGB/T 21562.2-2015: Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Guide to the application for safety---This is an excerpt. Full copy of true-PDF in English version (including equations, symbols, images, flow-chart, tables, and figures etc.), auto-downloaded/delivered in 9 seconds, can be purchased online: https://www.ChineseStandard.net/PDF.aspx/GBT21562.2-2015 GB NATIONAL STANDARD OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ICS 45.060 S 04 Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) - Part 2.Guide to the application for safety Issued on. DECEMBER 31, 2015 Implemented on. JULY 01, 2016 Issued by. General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine; Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China. Table of ContentsForeword... 5 Introduction... 6 1 Scope... 7 2 Normative references... 9 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations... 9 4 Guidelines for the concept of related organizations / entities and systems hierarchy and safety... 20 5 General risk models and common functional hazard checklists for typical railway application systems... 28 6 Application guidelines for functional safety, functional safety requirements, SI objectives, risk apportionment, and SIL... 49 7 Safety proof guide combined with probabilistic and deterministic methods ... 73 8 Guidelines for risk acceptance principle... 88 9 Basic element guide related to safety proof documents (safety arguments) ... 95 Appendix A (Informative) Steps of risk assessment process... 112 Appendix B (Informative) Hazard checklist at the railway application system level... 127 Appendix C (Informative) Risk category classification method... 137 Appendix D (Informative) British railway system risk model diagram... 142 Appendix E (Informative) Technology and methods... 148 Appendix F (Informative) Graphical representation of availability concepts. 164 Appendix G (Informative) Example of establishing risk acceptance criteria. 166 Appendix H (Informative) Example of safety argument overview... 172 References... 1811 Scope1.1 This part of GB/T 21562 gives guidance on the safety process requirements of railway application systems specified in GB/T 21562-2008 and on the specific issues involved in the safety activities at various stages of the system life cycle (see 1.3). This part applies to all systems covered by the scope of GB/T 21562- 2008.This part assumes that users are familiar with safety issues, but GB/T 21562-2008 lacks detailed guidance on certain safety issues. 1.2 GB/T 21562-2008 is the basic RAMS standard for the top level of the system. This part is a supplement to GB/T 21562-2008 and applies only to the safety issues stated in 1.3. 1.3 This part only gives guidance on the following issues within the scope of GB/T 21562-2008. structures of safety demonstration documentation (safety arguments). 1.4 Table 1 illustrates the scope and limitations of the safety activities at various stages of the life cycle as defined in GB/T 21562-2008, and defines the roles/responsibilities of key players. It should combine all the contents of this part for the in-depth understanding of Table 1.2 Normative referencesThe following documents are essential to the application of this document. For the dated documents, only the versions with the dates indicated are applicable to this document; for the undated documents, only the latest version (including all the amendments) are applicable to this standard. GB/T 20438.4-2006 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems - Part 4.Definitions and abbreviations (IEC 61508-4.1998, IDT) GB/T 21562-2008 Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) (IEC 62278.2002, IDT) GB/T 28808-2012 Railway applications - Communication, signaling and processing systems - Software for railway control and protection systems (IEC 62279.2002, IDT)3 Terms, definitions and abbreviationsThe following terms, definitions and abbreviations apply to this document. 3.1 Explanation of terms and definitions used in GB/T 21562- Note. The following clauses give further explanation to the definition of GB/T 21562-2008, and the term clause number corresponding to GB/T 21562-2008 is given in brackets. 3.1.3 Failure rate Limit, if this exists, of the ratio of the conditional probability that the instant of time, T, of a failure of a product falls within a given time interval (t, t + Δt) and the length of this interval, Δt, when Δt tends towards zero, given that the item is in an up state at the start of the time interval. 3.1.7 Railway authority The organization that has full responsibility for the managers of the operating track system. 3.1.8 Risk Probable rate of occurrence of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity of the harm.4 Guidelines for the concept of related organizations / entities and systems hierarchy and safety4.1 Overview Considering the interaction of the system and its environment, GB/T 21562- 2008 defines safety as “avoiding unacceptable risk of harm”. This definition covers all aspects of safety, including functional and technical safety, health and safety issues, and human factors. 4.2 Related organizations/entities in the system Depending on the social/policy environment and organizational/management structure associated with the railway application system, there may be several organizations/entities performing different functions in each phase of the system life cycle. 4.3 Concepts of system level 4.3.1 Basic concepts The basic concepts of nesting systems and hierarchies are shown in Figure 1. 4.3.2 Railway application system environment and system level Railway application systems usually operate in a socio-economic/policy environment. 4.4 Safety concept 4.4.1 Hazards 4.4.2 Risk 4.4.2.1 Overview Risk (as defined in 3.1.8) is related to the occurrence and severity of damage. The damage may be. 4.4.2.3 Environmental damage Environmental damage refers to the damage to related property, the proliferation of toxic substances or other harmful agents in the environment, and fire, etc. 4.4.2.4 Commercial damage Commercial damage refers to damage to property/assets of stakeholders, damage to operating reputation, or loss of customers. It is a commercial problem. 4.4.3 Risk normalization5 General risk models and common functional hazard checklists for typical railway application systems5.1 Overview This clause introduces the concept of a general risk model, gives guidance on the risk assessment process and application, and gives a hazard checklist. 5.2 General risk model Modeling is primarily a simplification and generalization of reality, in order to understand causality and highlight important factors. Modeling is an effective tool for estimating and forecasting the future. 5.3 Risk assessment process 5.3.1 Overview Risk assessment mainly includes hazard identification, risk assessment and risk tolerance judgment. Risk management includes identifying and implementing economic and practical risk control measures, and ensuring that resources are continuously used to control and maintain risks at an acceptable level. 5.3.2 General procedures 5.3.2.1 Overview The general procedure is divided into two major steps. 5.3.2.4 Hazard records Hazard records are a tool for recording the hazards identified and the actions taken or actions to be taken. These measures and actions reduce the hazard to permissible levels. 5.4.6 Sensitivity analysis When performing risk analysis and subsequent analysis of tolerance, assumptions shall generally be made; due to the lack of data, the quantification of hazard frequency/probability and accident consequences can only be given through judgment, so the methods of assumption and judgment are to a large extent determine the overall risk and tolerance assessment results. Sensitivity analysis can be used to manage the impact of these assumptions and judgments. 5.4.7 Risk assessment at each stage of the fife cycle 5.4.7.1 Overview As described in GB/T 21562-2008, risk assessment shall be repeated at various stages of the life cycle (see the last paragraph of A.2.4). The following clauses describe the application of the risk assessment process at different stages of design, maintenance and operation. 5.5 General function hazard checklist 5.5.1 Overview Historically, safety has been improved by drawing lessons from painful accidents. Now it takes a more active and systematic approach to study causes of hazards and expand the scope of consideration. Hazard identification is a key step in the overall safety assurance process. Although multiple technologies are used in separate projects, the general system/industry-level approach is not yet complete.6 Application guidelines for functional safety, functional safety requirements, SI objectives, risk apportionment, and SIL6.1 Overview When hazard identification, hazard analysis, and risk assessment (see 5.3 and 5.4) are completed, safety requirements shall be determined based on the results of these efforts. The determination of safety requirements is a repeated activity that reflects the repeated nature of risk assessment. It is therefore normal for overlap and repetition of the description of activities in different clauses of the part. 6.2.1 System features All necessary system functions (basic requirements) shall be determined based on the goals of the created system and the system requirements. System design may also generate additional requirements, to ensure complete system functionality. 6.2.3 Safety-related functions and technical features and overall system safety At the railway application system level, the basic functions (created based on the system’s goals and system requirements) usually include (for example only used for passenger operations). 6.3.2 Apportionment method of safety objectives Prior to assigning safety goals, the overall system shall be defined with effective overall safety objectives. 6.4.4 Controlling random failures and systematic faults to achieve SI 6.4.4.1 Overview SI is the expression of the failure rate and corresponding qualitative measures required to achieve THR (i.e., the accident tolerability frequency). To achieve this goal, all hazards associated with the system or subsystem shall be controlled. 6.5 Fault-safety system guideline 6.5.1 Fault-safety concept7 Safety proof guide combined with probabilistic and deterministic methods7.1 Overview The safety of railway application systems is usually ensured through the application of appropriate processes, procedures, tools, rules and methods throughout the life cycle of products, processes, systems and operations, but due to the complexity and novelty of many modern systems and tasks, these methods are difficult to give a better certainty. 7.2 Safety argument 7.2.1 Overview The procedure given in GB/T 21562-2008 covers the RAMS activities required to build the system. 7.2.2 Guidance on detailed safety certification methods The safety certification of the system shall not be confined to certain nodes of the system life cycle, but cover the entire life cycle of the system (whether or not the system-related risks are acceptable) and influence the final decision (usually at the system acceptance stage 10 of the life cycle of GB/T 21562- 2008). 7.5 Combining deterministic and probabilistic methods A deterministic method can be used to analyze the system from top to bottom, after reaching a certain level, use probabilistic methods to deeply analyze some components.8 Guidelines for risk acceptance principle8.1 Overview Although there may be more acceptance principles, this clause only gives further guidance on the principles of risk acceptance given in clause 4.6.3.3 of GB/T 21562-2008. 8.2 Application of risk acceptance principle The method of proof of acceptable risk level shall be in accordance with national laws, and the risk acceptance level can be set based on the principle of risk acceptance; 8.3 ALARP principle 8.3.1 Definition of ALARP ALARP is one of the principles of risk assessment. ALARP divides the risk area in accordance with the acceptance criteria boundary and determines the following three areas. 8.3.2 Calculation of frequency and consequences Assuming that the acceptance criteria have been defined, the next step is to perform hazard tree analysis (FTA), which is identified during the preliminary hazard identification and analysis (PHIA) process. 8.4 GAMAB (GAME) principle 8.4.1 Overview This clause gives the application guide for GAMAB as described in D.2 of GB/T 21562-2008.GAMAB originated from the pioneering risk acceptance principle in France, 8.4.2 Basic principles The following prerequisites shall be satisfied. 8.5 MEM (minimum endogenous mortality) safety principle (see D.3 in GB/T 21562-2008)9 Basic element guide related to safety proof documents (safety arguments)9.1 Overview The safety arguments are referenced in the relevant tasks of the project stage of Figure 9 of GB/T 21562-2008.For further explanation of safety arguments, see clauses 6.6 and 6.9 of GB/T 21562-2008.This clause further explains the different types of safety arguments and their contents. 9.2 Use of safety arguments Safety certification is widely used, and the most important thing is to prove the safety of the system. Usually SRA shall also be approved in accordance with safety arguments. 9.3 Scope of safety arguments The scope of safety arguments shall be determined by defining the system, the system’s safety functions, the system integrity and processes required to implement these functions; if feasible, it should also determine the project stages and the deliverables of these stages of GB/T 21562-2008. 9.4 Levels of safety argument 9.6 Safety argument structure GB/T 28809-2012 describes the general structure of safety arguments. The advantage of this structure is that it is compatible with various technologies and can provide a unified framework for any safety argument. ......Source: Above contents are excerpted from the full-copy PDF -- translated/reviewed by: www.ChineseStandard.net / Wayne Zheng et al. 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