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GB/T 21562.2-2015

Chinese Standard: 'GB/T 21562.2-2015'
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BASIC DATA
Standard ID GB/T 21562.2-2015 (GB/T21562.2-2015)
Description (Translated English) Railway applications - Specification and demonstration ofreliability, availability, maintainability and safety(RAMS) - Part 2: Guide to the application for safety
Sector / Industry National Standard (Recommended)
Classification of Chinese Standard S04
Classification of International Standard 45.060
Word Count Estimation 109,153
Date of Issue 2015-12-31
Date of Implementation 2016-07-01
Drafting Organization Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Co., Ltd.
Administrative Organization National electric traction systems and equipment Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC 278)
Regulation (derived from) State Standard Announcement 2015 No.43
Proposing organization National Railways
Issuing agency(ies) Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of People's Republic of China; Standardization Administration of China

GB/T 21562.2-2015
GB
NATIONAL STANDARD OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ICS 45.060
S 04
Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of
reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) -
Part 2. Guide to the application for safety
轨道交通 可靠性, 可用性, 可维修性和安全性规范及示例
第 2部分. 安全性的应用指南
ISSUED ON. DECEMBER 31, 2015
IMPLEMENTED ON. JULY 01, 2016
Issued by. General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine;
Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of
China.
Table of Contents
Foreword ... 5
Introduction ... 6
1 Scope ... 7
2 Normative references ... 9
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations ... 9
3.1 Explanation of terms and definitions used in GB/T 21562-2008 ... 10
3.2 Other safety terms ... 15
3.3 Abbreviations ... 19
4 Guidelines for the concept of related organizations/entities and systems
hierarchy and safety ... 20
4.1 Overview ... 20
4.2 Related organizations/entities in the system ... 20
4.3 Concepts of system level ... 21
4.4 Safety concept ... 23
5 General risk models and common functional hazard checklists for typical
railway application systems ... 28
5.1 Overview ... 28
5.2 General risk model... 29
5.3 Risk assessment process ... 30
5.4 Application of risk assessment process ... 37
5.5 General function hazard checklist ... 45
6 Application guidelines for functional safety, functional safety requirements,
SI objectives, risk apportionment, and SIL ... 49
6.1 Overview ... 49
6.2 Functional safety and technical safety ... 49
6.3 General considerations for risk apportionment ... 53
6.4 SI concept and SIL application ... 56
6.5 Fault-safety system guideline ... 69
7 Safety proof guide combined with probabilistic and deterministic methods
... 73
7.1 Overview ... 74
7.2 Safety argument ... 74
7.3 Deterministic methods ... 85
7.4 Probabilistic methods... 86
7.5 Combining deterministic and probabilistic methods ... 86
7.6 Methods for mechanical and hybrid (mechatronic) systems ... 87
8 Guidelines for risk acceptance principle ... 88
8.1 Overview ... 88
8.2 Application of risk acceptance principle ... 88
8.3 ALARP principle ... 90
8.4 GAMAB (GAME) principle ... 91
8.5 MEM (minimum endogenous mortality) safety principle (see D.3 in GB/T
21562-2008) ... 94
9 Basic element guide related to safety proof documents (safety arguments)
... 95
9.1 Overview ... 95
9.2 Use of safety arguments ... 96
9.3 Scope of safety arguments ... 96
9.4 Levels of safety argument... 97
9.5 Stages of safety argument ... 99
9.6 Safety argument structure ... 100
9.7 Safety assessment ... 106
9.8 Interface with existing systems ... 107
9.9 System mutual recognition criteria ... 108
Appendix A (Informative) Steps of risk assessment process ... 112
A.1 System definition ... 112
A.2 Hazard identification ... 113
A.3 Hazard records ... 118
A.4 Consequence analysis ... 119
A.5 Hazard control ... 121
A.6 Risk rating ... 122
Appendix B (Informative) Hazard checklist at the railway application system
level ... 127
B.1 Overview ... 127
B.2 Examples of hazard classification based on affected people ... 128
B.3 Example of function-based hazard classification ... 133
Appendix C (Informative) Risk category classification method ... 137
C.1 Functional subdivision method (a) ... 137
C.2 System (constitution) decomposition method (b) ... 138
C.3 Hazard breakdown method (c) ... 139
C.4 Subdivision methods based on hazard cause (d) ... 140
C.5 Subdivision methods based on accident types (e) ... 141
Appendix D (Informative) British railway system risk model diagram ... 142
D.1 Building a risk model ... 142
D.2 Illustrative examples of the UK railway risk model ... 143
Appendix E (Informative) Technology and methods ... 148
E.1 Overview ... 148
E.2 Fast rating analysis ... 149
E.3 Structured assumption analysis ... 150
E.4 HAZOP ... 151
E.5 Status transition diagram ... 152
E.6 Message sequence diagram ... 152
E.7 Failure mode effect and criticality analysis - FMECA ... 153
E.8 Event tree analysis ... 154
E.9 Fault tree analysis ... 156
E.10 Risk map method ... 157
E.11 Other analysis techniques ... 158
E.12 Guide for deterministic method and probabilistic method ... 159
E.13 Selection of tools and methods ... 162
Appendix F (Informative) Graphical representation of availability concepts . 164
Appendix G (Informative) Example of establishing risk acceptance criteria . 166
G.1 Example of ALARP application ... 166
G.2 Copenhagen subway ... 170
Appendix H (Informative) Example of safety argument overview ... 172
H.1 Locomotive and rolling stock ... 172
H.2 Signal ... 175
H.3 Infrastructure ... 178
References ... 181
Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of
reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) -
Part 2. Guide to the application for safety
1 Scope
1.1 This part of GB/T 21562 gives guidance on the safety process requirements
of railway application systems specified in GB/T 21562-2008 and on the specific
issues involved in the safety activities at various stages of the system life cycle
(see 1.3). This part applies to all systems covered by the scope of GB/T 21562-
2008. This part assumes that users are familiar with safety issues, but GB/T
21562-2008 lacks detailed guidance on certain safety issues.
1.2 GB/T 21562-2008 is the basic RAMS standard for the top level of the system.
This part is a supplement to GB/T 21562-2008 and applies only to the safety
issues stated in 1.3.
1.3 This part only gives guidance on the following issues within the scope of
GB/T 21562-2008.
a) The establishment of top-level generic risk models for the overall system
of railway application to its major components (such as signals, rolling
stock, and infrastructure, etc.), the definition of model components and
their interactions;
b) The establishment of general function hazard checklists for railway
application systems (including high-speed lines, light rail and subways,
etc.);
c) The application of risk acceptance principle in GB/T 21562-2008;
d) Application and examples of qualitative assessment of functional safety
and tolerable risks in railway application systems;
e) The functional safety requirements and the definitions of assigning the
safety objectives to the subsystems (e.g. railway application vehicles,
door systems, braking systems, etc.);
f) The application of safety integrity levels at all stages of the system's life
cycle;
Failures due to errors in any safety life cycle activity, within any phase, which
cause it to fail under some particular combination of inputs or under some
particular environmental condition.
[GB/T 21562-2008, Definition 3.42]
GB/T 20438.4-2006 gives a different definition of this term, but there is no
substantial difference between the two, it is specifically defined as. failure to
determine the cause, only the design or manufacturing process, operating
procedures, documents or other related factors are modified, it is possible to
eliminate this failure.
Note 1. Repair maintenance without change usually cannot eliminate the
cause of failure.
Note 2. Systematic failure can be caused by simulating the cause of failure.
Note 3. Examples of systematic failures including human errors.
- Safety requirements specifications;
- Hardware design, manufacture, installation and operation;
- Software design and implementation.
Note 4. The failures of safety-related systems are classified into two types.
random failure and system failure.
3.1.12
Tolerable risk
The maximum level of risk of a product that is acceptable to the railway
authority.
[GB/T 21562-2008, Definition 3.43]
The railway authority (RA) is responsible for negotiating risk acceptance
criteria and risk acceptance level with the safety regulatory authority (SRA)
and providing it to the railway support industry (RSI) (see 5.3.2). The risk
acceptance level is usually defined by the SRA or negotiated between the
RA and the SRA. The risk acceptance level depends on national laws or
regulations.
3.2 Other safety terms
This clause lists the safety terms not defined in GB/T 21562-2008 but used in
Although each has a different meaning, these terms are closely related to
each other. To avoid misunderstandings, the following differences in these
terms shall be considered.
- Failure is the termination of the individual's ability to perform the required
functions;
Note 1. After a failure occurs, the individual has a fault.
Note 2. “Failure” is an event that is different from “fault” as a state.
- A fault is an individual condition manifested in the inability to perform the
required function, but it is not included in the period of preventative
maintenance, other planned actions, or loss of ability due to lack of external
resources;
Note 3. Fault is usually the cause of the individual's own failure, but it can
also exist without causing any failure.
- Errors are differences between calculated, observed, measured values or
status and the actually determined or theoretically correct values or states;
Note 4. Errors may be due to fault individuals, such as calculation errors
caused by fault computer equipment.
- Human errors or mistakes are human activities that produce unexpected
results.
The fault may be an incorrect signal value or an incorrect decision in the
system. If a fault occurs, its resulting errors (such as incorrect information
or system status) may affect the system.
If the functional unit is no longer able to perform the required function, a
failure occurs, i.e. the failure is the result due to internal errors or failures
and is observable at the system boundary. Errors or fault do not necessarily
lead to failures. For example, internal error checking can correct errors.
Therefore, failure is only a functional problem. It is related to the effect and
has nothing to do with the physical integrity of the individual.
3.2.8
Functional safety
In the normal operating conditions and fault modes that respond to external
stimulus, the safety depending on the system function, as shown in 6.2.
3.2.9
SRA. Safety Regulatory Authority (as defined in 3.1.7)
THR. Tolerate Hazard Rate, also known as the “hazard occurrence rate”, the
risk caused by this hazard is at an acceptable level (usually judged by accepted
organizations as acceptable, such as RA, RSI and SRA negotiation, or SRA
itself).
4 Guidelines for the concept of related organizations
/ entities and systems hierarchy and safety
4.1 Overview
Considering the interaction of the system and its environment, GB/T 21562-
2008 defines safety as “avoiding unacceptable risk of harm”. This definition
covers all aspects of safety, including functional and technical safety, health and
safety issues, and human factors.
Clause 4 gives a description of the relevant organizations/entities in the railway
application system. It further explains some basic concepts (such as risk,
hazard, harm, and safety) in system level, safety, and risk assessment. It
supplements the railway application RAMS analysis as well as the impact
factors as given in 4.3 and 4.4 of GB/T 21562-2008.
4.2 Related organizations/entities in the system
Depending on the social/policy environment and organizational/management
structure associated with the railway application system, there may be several
organizations/entities performing different functions in each phase of the
system life cycle. For the purpose of guidance, the organizations/entities are
divided into three major categories (as defined in GB/T 21562-2008), as shown
below (including 3.1.7).
- RA (Infrastructure management and/or railway application operator);
- SRA (Safety regulatory authority);
- RSI (System vendor/installer/manufacturer).
The roles and responsibilities of these organizations may change, or may be
outsourced to some other participants or subcontractors, depending on.
- Social, policy or legal considerations;
- Size and complexity of the relevant system or subsystem;
System functions are the activities performed by the system as a whole.
Function and structure are internal views that reflect the characteristics of the
system and are related to the organization/entity responsible for system design.
The environment consists of any object that affects or is affected by the system.
- Any objects that is mechanically or electrically connected or otherwise
connected by other methods of the system, such as electromagnetic
interference and heat sources;
- People and procedures that affect the system or are affected by the system
during system operation.
Correct understanding of the boundary between the system under
consideration and the environment as well as its interaction with the
interconnected subsystems is a prerequisite for understanding how the system
causes accidents and system hazards (see 6.2.2).
4.3.2 Railway application system environment and system level
Railway application systems usually operate in a socio-economic/policy
environment. The economics of designing, constructing, implementing, and
using the system also depend on the socio-economic/policy environment.
Therefore, the system safety shall be considered from the current safety level
of the system economy, the current safety level of the social environment, and
the social/policy-allowed safety levels. No matter how safe the system is,
systems that users cannot afford will reduce the safety in the social environment
in which they are located.
Within the socio-economic/policy system, the relevant competent authorities of
the railway application system are responsible for the balanced consideration
of economy and safety, and formulate safety requirements and targets for the
overall system safety risk level. Usually this target may not be suitable at the
earlier period of the project, the organization/entity responsible for the system
(such as design/configuration) can modify the target and submit it to the
relevant authority for approval.
In accordance with the hierarchical structure of the system, the
organization/entity responsible for the railway application system (e.g., RA)
shall establish the subsystem safety requirements and goals that correspond to
the levels of risk allowed by the subsystems. Typically, the responsible
organizations/entities for each level of system design/configuration define the
safety requirements and goals for their subsystems; in some cases, the RA
establishes safety requirements and goals for lower-level subsystems or
specific risks.
identified and that their management responsibilities and measures are clearly
defined and properly understood by the relevant organizations/entities.
Introducing the concept of “interface hazards” is very important, because these
hazards are difficult to find in a single system, but they occur when different
systems interact.
4.4.1.5 Hazards at system boundary
Figure 2 describes the relationship between system boundaries, hazards,
causes of hazards, and accidents (see Figure A.4 in ISO/IEC 14408.2012). This
figure shows that when considering from the subsystem boundary (outside the
subsystem), the failure or fault of the subsystem (i.e., the subsystem level
hazard) is the cause of the system level hazard (inside the system). By using
this concept, the structured hierarchical methods can be used for hazard
analysis and hazard tracking in a nesting system, and for hazard identification
and cause analysis at multiple system levels. This method is particularly
suitable for the system development stage.
The hazards at the system boundary are only relevant to the function of the
system under consideration. The description of hazards should consider all
interactions with other related systems, these factors may reduce the hazards.
Two examples are given below.
a) If a subsystem-related hazard is monitored by other subsystems, the
safety requirements for the hazard should consider the mitigation
measures implemented by the monitoring equipment and the subsequent
risk time;
b) At the subsystem level, the occlusion of axle-boxes on high-speed trains
can be regarded as a hazard. If the vehicle is running on a line with
equipment monitoring (e.g., a shaft temperature detector), the safety
requirements for the hazard should consider the presence of the
monitoring equipment and the subsequent risk time.
Therefore, allocating safety requirements within the system is a detailed
process that may require repeated iterations to ensure that the relevant
responsible parties (such as the team responsible for the development of
subsystems) correctly understand the safety requirements.
control risk), so these factors shall be considered comprehensively to establish
risk tolerance criteria.
For the railway application system, the relevant authorities can classify people
exposed risks in different ways, for example, they can be divided into three
groups. passengers, railway application workers (i.e., personnel hired or
contracted by RA or RSI, or authorized by RA to perform railway application
specific tasks), and the general public. In these groups, the risk acceptance
criteria for the three groups may be different due to the different levels of
association with the system and the differences in capabilities that result in
different risks. At the beginning of the project, it is advisable to consult with the
relevant competent authorities to determine the specific criteria.
The level of risk faced by each group may also be affected by many factors.
These factors include.
- Personnel exposure, such as the duration and frequency of contact hazards
of personnel, as well as the probability of the personnel exposed to hazards
to identify hazards, make timely response and actively take measures to
avoid accidents;
- The duration of the hazard, such as the duration of the hazard, and the
probability of the person being exposed to the hazard;
- Risk-triggering events and/or conditions that may cause accidents, as well
as the overall possibility and probability of occurrence;
- A series of events/conditions of the triggering events or follow-up triggering
events that may cause accident, and the accidents that result from it are
less likely to occur as a whole but the consequences of the accident are
serious.
Figure 3 shows an example of the above factors causing the accident to expand.
It shall be noted that safety barrier (protection) measures can be set at the
hazard level, triggering event level or accident level to reduce the risk.
Triggering event and failure of safety barrier are necessary conditions for the
accident.
consistent with the basic measurement method, to facilitate risk communication
and comparison. For example, the damage occurrence rate depends on the
number of people affected (such as the number of employees involved in
maintenance and the number of working hours, etc.), traffic density, train
mileage, passenger mileage, train or passenger hours, number of trips, number
of train operations and landforms (such as number of tunnels, bridges, and
crossings). The following subclauses outline the basic concepts of
normalization.
4.4.3.2 Event rate (reference base for probability of occurrence)
The RA and the relevant SRA shall, through negotiation or based on the
generally acknowledged principles, determine the harm/death rate of different
groups affected by railway application. This rate is only used as a reference for
event processing and comparison. For example, the unit rate of risk for
passengers and public groups can either use the yearly accumulative injury of
each group as the basis, or convert it into individual risk.
4.4.3.3 Equivalent death (injury reference basis)
See definition in 3.2.6. The RA and SRA shall make negotiation to determine
the relationship between the number of injuries and the number of deaths. This
rate is only used as a reference for event processing and comparison. For
example, the conversion formula can be. 1 equivalent death = 1 death = 10
major injuries = 100 minor injuries.
5 General risk models and common functional hazard
checklists for typical railway application systems
5.1 Overview
This clause introduces the concept of a general risk model, gives guidance on
the risk assessment process and application, and gives a hazard checklist.
The railway application system presents many characteristics in the course of
transportation services, among which safety is more stringent than forecasting,
management and delivery, directly affecting the railway application system and
related companies. The social law/regulatory system imposes further
restrictions on the performance of the railway application system, to control the
human or environmental damage caused by the product or system. Historically,
the improvement of safety has been achieved through tragic accident lessons.
Today, it systematically focuses on the root causes of safety issues, expands
the scope of considerations, understands safety issues in depth, and solves
problems in a more proactive manner. The method of drawing lessons from the
accident can continue to be retained, but it is not an ideal safety method.
A systematic approach to safety requires an understanding of the risk
assessment process, while understanding the structure of the railway
application system and its interaction with the environment. Clause 5.3 gives a
description of the risk assessment process, and clause 6.2.2 describes the
structural principles of the railway application system and other relevant factors.
Clause 5.4 gives some guidance on the depth and type of necessary risk
assessment.
5.2 General risk model
Modeling is primarily a simplification and generalization of reality, in order to
understand causality and highlight important factors. Modeling is an effective
tool for estimating and forecasting the future.
It can create risk models for specific tasks (e.g., hazard occurrences, hazard
combinations, operations, subsystems, etc.) in accordance with the risk
assessment process for specific applications or the entire railway application
system.
Establishing risk prediction/description models for products, processes, or
systems is a major step in systematically understanding risk and early safety
management. The model essentially appears as an abstract view of the system,
irrespective of its qualitative or quantitative characteristics, it should satisfy the
following requirements in order to facilitate the implementation of the safety
process.
- A systematic description negotiated and agreed by all stakeholders;
- Explicit system elements, boundaries and key external and internal
interfaces, preferably using graphic representations;
- Support the construction of a safety-related decision-making environment,
while providing a comprehensive record of the system's life cycle.
Most risk assessments only consider the risks of passengers. Because safety
risks are directed at people, it is important to identify all affected groups and
determine their tolerable risks. Establish a safety risk assessment for all groups
that come into contact with the railway application system, assess the risk of
each group based on a consistent baseline (such as yearly or per trip/train
mileage).
Establishing a risk model for the entire railway application system involves a
large amount of work, and due to the diversity of the environment, operations
and interfaces with other systems of railway application systems, the
differences and quality of available data, the complexity of models, and the
overall availability of integrated model tools, as well as for large and complex
models that are difficult to identify, it is not appropriate to give a general risk
model for the overall railway application system. The remainder of this clause
only presents the general risk assessment process and its application, and
gives a hazard checklist.
Depending on the purpose of the analysis, risk models that are evaluated using
quantitative, qualitative, or synthetic methods are used at different system
levels, to perform basic function assessment for the higher level functions and
assess the technical plans of the lower level functions.
Appendix D lists the basic steps for establishing a risk model and a graphical
example of a railway application system risk prediction model.
5.3 Risk assessment process
5.3.1 Overview
Risk assessment mainly includes hazard identification, risk assessment and
risk tolerance judgment. Risk management includes identifying and
implementing economic and practical risk control measures, and ensuring that
resources are continuously used to control and maintain risks at an acceptable
level.
Risk analysis is an important part of the life cycle of the entire system shown in
Figure 8 of GB/T 21562-2008 and shall be carried out at different stages of the
life cycle. Clause 6.4 of GB/T 21562-2008 gives a summary description based
on basic risk concept and risk analysis, assessment and acceptance. The
above “risk assessment” includes the “risk analysis”, “risk assessment and
acceptance” in 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 of GB/T 21562-2008. The “risk analysis” in the
system life cycle shown in Figure 8 of GB/T 21562-2008 shall be regarded as
a “risk assessment” in a strict sense, clause 5.3.2 gives a further description of
the general risk assessment process, clause 5.4 gives the guidance on the
process application and analysis depth and breadth.
Risk assessment using qualitative, quantitative or comprehensive methods is a
systematic and structured approach, which is used for.
a) Identify incidents that can directly or indirectly cause casualties related to
the operation and maintenance of the system; in the railway application
operating environment, these personnel may be passengers, workers or
members of the public;
b) Identify hazards that can lead to an accident, i.e. component/subsystem
or system failure, physical effects, human error or operating conditions;
c) Formulate measures to deal with or limit all types of hazards that cannot
be eliminated;
d) Estimate the frequency of hazards and accidents (if feasible);
e) Estimate the consequences of the accident in the form of casualties. If the
risk needs to be reduced, take measures to control or limit.
- Various types of hazards that cannot be eliminated by identifying the
cause and accident triggering conditions;
- The consequences of related accidents;
f) Estimate the overall risk associated with a major accident;
g) Estimate the individual risk associated with the exposure group (if feasible);
h) It shall determine the additional measures necessary to reduce the risk to
an acceptable level of SRA (e.g., meet the established risk acceptance
criteria);
i) Give documents that fully demonstrate the risk assessment methods,
assumptions, data, judgments and descriptions.
5.3.2 General procedures
5.3.2.1 Overview
The general procedure is divided into two major steps.
a) The risk assessment process, which consists of the following components.
- System definition;
- Hazard identification, including hazard records;
- Consequence analysis;
- Risk assessment and THR apportionment under appropriate conditions.
b) Hazard control procedures. Hazard control, including causal analysis and
common cause analysis.
The execution of the entire process requires an in-depth understanding of the
system and its functions, design, operation, maintenance and operating
environment. The main responsibility of each procedure is mainly determined
by the scope of the organization/entity’s influence on the system or the
5.3.2.2 System definition
The system and its physical and logical boundaries (the interface between the
system and other systems and environments) shall be clearly defined.
Understanding the boundary between the system and the environment is a
prerequisite for understanding how the system causes accidents. The
environment includes anything that can affect the system and be affected by
the system, such as other systems connected to the system (mechanical,
pneumatic, and electronic, etc.), or things that affect through electromagnetic
interference, voltage fluctuations, and heat exchange; the environment also
includes personnel and programs that may affect system or be affected by
system.
A.1 gives further explanation of the system definition.
5.3.2.3 Hazard identification and preliminary hazard analysis
Hazard identification is the basis of risk assessment. In all best practice models
for safety engineering and management, hazard identification is a critical step
in the overall safety assurance. The lack of systematic and comprehensive
identification of hazards can seriously affect the risk assessment process. In
the most unfavorable situations, it may also create safety illusions and false
sense of trust.
Hazards should be systematically identified to ensure that people, processes,
and systems work patterns (normal, degraded, and emergency modes) are
covered, and that the results are collated and recorded; then analyzed to
eliminate correlations; and grades are assessed based on the impact of each
hazard, finally, a set of trusted “C-hazards” with different levels of severity is
defined at the railway application system level. Although systematic processes
can increase the integrity of hazard identification, they do not guarantee integrity.
All stakeholders should consult and reach consensus on the actual scope of
hazard identification activities. In some cases, it may be appropriate to limit the
analysis to hazards that can lead to personal injury, but in other situations (such
as transporting dangerous goods), it may be more reasonable to include other
types of harm in the analysis.
The hazards shall be listed after the hazards have been determined. The
hazard information is usually updated in the hazard record (see 5.3.2.4).
Often single hazard is associated with multiple causes. If a large number of
hazards are identified, it shall be checked whether the multiple causes of the
individual hazard have been identified one by one.
A preliminary hazard analysis is carried out to classify hazards in accordance
with a severe sequence of risks, thereby concentrating risk assessment
Consequence analysis is the establishment of intermediate conditions/events
and evaluation of hazard development (taking into account any accident
triggering factors and/or possible events that may cause the associated losses
to rise, for example, after a train derails, there may be a collapse of the bridge
on the train, a fire, or release of toxic substance), so as to assess the probability
of a “C-hazard” that leads to the accident and the extent to which the accident
could result in a loss.
A.4 gives further explanation of the consequences analysis.
5.3.2.6 Risk assessment and apportionment of THRs
Risk assessment and assessment are based on risk acceptance criteria. The
risk acceptance criteria shall be based on legal or other requirements agreed
by the SRA (e.g., major legal requirements, existing technical standards,
existing safety systems or processes, etc.). Clause 7.2 explains how to adopt
the relevant technical standards or reference systems as guidelines for
approval of safety certification. It shall be based on the risk acceptance criteria
to introduce the risk reduction and/or risk avoidance measures, so as to reduce
unacceptably high risks to acceptable or tolerable levels. Risk acceptance
criteria can also be given qualitatively.
Based on the estimated accident rate and accident-related loss tolerance, the
value of the hazard rate for identifying the hazard is recalculated and each
hazard tolerance THRs is determined (see 6.3.3). THRs are inputs for hazard
control.
There are some situations where it is difficult to determine the THR value.
- For mechanical parts that depend on the material's durability and design
tolerance properties during the specified product life cycle;
- Electrical hazards that rely on technical measures (to avoid electric shock
and induced voltage) may depend on the insulation and grounding design;
in this case, it is difficult to determine the frequency of failure and the
measurable hazard rate;
- It is almost impossible to determine the THR in the operational management
part (including operators and maintenance personnel, etc.).
For these situations, it shall decide whether to use THR or THRs.
As the responsible agency, the RA shall carry out risk assessment at the railway
application system level and shall define the THR of general applications of
public systems based on the results of the assessment, that is, the maximum
acceptable rate of occurrence of hazards, and it shall meet the requirements of
laws and regulations and public safety objectives.
5.4.2 Analysis depth
GB/T 21562-2008 applies to the entire railway application system or subsystem,
but the degree of analysis required for safety demonstration depends on the
specific subsystem, the degree of inspection in the application, the novelty of
design or application, environmental differences, and system boundary
condition difference, interface differences, and risk level factors that are
presented, so safety demonstration work should be appropriate and sufficient
to meet these conditions. The safety plan should specify the depth of analysis
and methods for determining the depth of analysis.
The level of detail of the risk assessment shall be commensurate with the risk.
Risk assessment does not categorize every trivial hazard and does not expect
to identify hazards that exceed the current level of knowledge. Appropriate and
adequate risk assessments should be able to reflect a reasonably viable
forecast of railway application hazards and reflect the hazards associated with
the technologies used (e.g. functional and technical safety). Where practicable,
the risk assessment shall be linked to the accident history and cause records.
Due to the large scope and scale of risk assessment, it is difficult to define
“appropriate” and “sufficient”, and it is advisable to avoid excessively high
accuracy requirements. See 7.2 for guidance on safety proof methods.
The risk assessment process should adopt both qualitative and quantitative
assessment methods.
Qualitative risk assessments may satisfy most hazard analyses. Risk ratings
(see A.6) can be used to identify the risks that require more in-depth
assessments. The sensitivity analysis (see 5.4.6) can also be used to obtain a
depth of in-depth assessment. However, hazards that may cause major or
catastrophic consequences shall be assessed in whole or in part for quantitative
risk, to determine the degree of risk, and help reduce systemic risk. If there are
quantitative safety requirements (such as the signal system referred to in GB/T
28809-2012), quantitative risk assessment shall be used. Because the new
system lacks sufficient experience to support empirically based qualitative
assessment methods, quantitative methods can be used for new systems.
For practical cases, quantitative risk assessment should be considered.
Evaluating risk is particularly difficult for accident types that are rare but have
serious consequences, such as catastrophic rail traffic accidents. The
frequency and severity of some accidents may be very sensitive to little-known
factors, and predictive uncertainty is very important for these situations.
The stakeholders (organizations/entities) of the system shall be informed of the
role and significance of qualitative risk assessment in the following areas.
- Raise awareness of such incidents;
It should create a risk rating matrix (see A.6 and Table E.2) based on the results
of the preliminary hazard analysis and determine whether a more detailed
analysis (qualitative or quantitative analysis) is required.
When determining the scope, function, and design of the system, it can
continuously improve the hazard identification, analyze the causes and results
of the hazards, and finally perform the risk assessment.
During each phase of the project, it is advisable to use the available information
for analysis as much as possible to give the best decision support, such as
whether there are new hazards during and the possible risks of these hazards
the implementation, maintenance and operation of the system.
5.4.4 Qualitative risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment
5.4.4.1 Overview
The risk assessment process defined in 5.3.2 is based on a risk assessment
framework that can support qualitative, quantitative, or integrated approaches.
Qualitative risk assessment is suitable for systematic failures and is the earliest
subjective judgment. Quantitative risk assessments are only used for random
failures. Comprehensive methods such as semi-quantitative methods can also
be used.
In the above method, if the results are obviously conservative (not
underestimating the risk), approximate methods can be used.
In addition to determining safety requirements using the methods described
above, risk assessment can be performed through qualitative methods based
on existing technical standards, similar systems that are recognized, credible
experience, and the judgment of industry experts.
5.4.4.2 Qualitative risk assessment
Qualitative risk assessment mainly depends on the judgement and credible
experience of industry experts, and deals with risks in a subjective and crude
way. It should carry out risk assessment process to a sufficient depth so that
the subjective assessment covers all possible hazards. There is no complete
non-quantitative assessment, which is usually done using orders of magnitude.
The advantages of qualitative risk assessment are.
- No detailed quantification, data acquisition or analysis required;
- Simple;
- It is not expensive as relative to quantitative risk assessment.
- Not suitable for assessing systemic failures;
- More expensive than qualitative risk assessments;
- May require a lot of resources.
Qualitative risk assessment can be used to assess most hazards, but for
hazards that may cause major or catastrophic consequences, it may be
necessary to determine the risk level and help reduce systemic risk through
quantitative risk assessment. When selecting quantitative safety requirements
(e.g., implementing the signal system of GB/T 28809-2012), it shall use the
quantitative risk assessment. The quantitative methods can be used in new
systems because the new system does not have enough experience to support
empirically based qualitative methods.
Quantitative risk assessment is more time-consuming and resource-intensive
than qualitative risk assessment, it is used only when greater credibility is
needed.
5.4.5 Using historical data
Risk assessment always depends on some inferences from the past to the
future. Historical data can be used for multiple stages and can also be used to
check the effectiveness of the risk model when building a risk model. it shall
carefully use historical data for the following reasons.
- It is difficult to determine the environmental information of historical data,
especially for rare accidents or catastrophic accidents and the environment
surrounding early events;
- It is difficult to identify secondary disasters (such as fire, derailment or
leakage of hazardous substances) caused by the incident.
Improper use of historical data may affect the effectiveness of the analysis and
significantly reduce the risk assessment accuracy.
When using historical data in an assessment, it is advisable to give a clear
argument that its use can accurately predict the losses associated with a
particular environment.
5.4.6 Sensitivity analysis
When performing risk analysis and subsequent analysis of tolerance,
assumptions shall generally be made; due to the lack of data, the quantification
of hazard frequency/probability and accident consequences can only be given
through judgment, so the methods of assumption and judgment are to a large
extent determine the overall risk and tolerance assessment results. Sensitivity
analysis can be used to manage the impact of these assumptions and
objectives, and safety requirements. At the subsystem level, RSI is responsible
for designing/providing equipment and establishing safety objectives and safety
requirements for lower-level subsystems/equipment (see 4.2 and 4.3). These
safety requirements shall also include the safety requirements for maintenance
and operations.
At the beginning of the project life cycle, the information obtained is usually
insufficient to support detailed risk assessments, and the analysis is usually
limited to the initial identification of hazards, but early discussion of each risk
control method can be made. It is advisable to conduct a preliminary hazard
analysis before starting a major design activity (see 5.4.3), but the function and
structure of the relevant system as well as the interface of the system with
personnel and other systems shall be determined in detail before the evaluation.
Risk assessment is a repeated process. As the design is carried out, it is
advisable to repeat the assessment at appropriate stages of the design process
and to make the assessment to the appropriate depth (see 5.4.2), to cover the
changes that have occurred and more details. If a hazard is identified, the
design can be modified to eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk.
Phases related to repeated risk assessment shall be recorded in the safety plan.
The hazard records should be updated at each stage (see 5.3.2.4) to
supplement any newly identified hazards and reflect the status of all hazards,
as detailed in stage 1 ~ stage 10 of clause 9.5 and Table 7.
The hazard record should be established at the earliest stage (see 5.3.2.4) and
updated at all stages of the project's life cycle.
5.4.7.3 Risk assessment in maintenance and operations phase
Stage 11 of GB/T 21562-2008 covers this assessment, the responsibility for
safety at these stages shall be transferred to the relevant organization/entity
(see 6.11 of GB/T 21562-2008).
The organizations/entities involved are usually the RA or representatives
designated by the RA, but in accordance with the contractual arrangements,
the relevant RSI may be required to assume the tasks (see 3.1.7 and 4.2), such
as the design, construction and operation as specified in the contract.
For risk assessment, the hazard record and safety requirements in the early
stages of the project are the beginning of risk control during maintenance and
operations. Safety requirements should include all operational and
maintenance information and documentation, including specific training
information, eligibility requirements information, specific equipment and facility
information. This information shall normally be given by the organization/entity
responsible for project design and implementation.
Identifying hazards and eliminating them or reducing them are important risk
countermeasures. In order to ensure effective processes and support mutual
recognition of safety systems, a common hazard grouping structure should be
determined through negotiation.
Ideally, the hazard grouping structure shall meet the following requirements.
- Cover/target the entire railway application system;
- Hazard descriptions help with subsequent hazard identification and cause
determination;
- Highly clear;
- Support coverage verification;
- Allow responsibility apportionment for each hazard and its causes;
- Facilitate apportionment of quantified safety goals;
- Can be used by RA or RSI;
- Support assigning risk objectives to system hazards and further assigning
THR to lower level functions;
- Improve the efficiency of hazard identification and ha......
Related standard: GB/T 21562.3-2015    GB/T 16566-2018
Related PDF sample: GB/T 21562.3-2015    GB 146.2-2020